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COLLUDING UNDER THE RADAR: ACHIEVING 
COLLUSION THROUGH VERTICAL EXCHANGE 
OF INFORMATION 
JULIA SHAMIR* 
NOAM SHAMIR** 
ABSTRACT 
In the absence of antitrust regulations, rational profit-maximizing firms in an 
oligopoly may freely act in consort to reach a consensus and to maintain prices above 
the competitive level. However, in light of potential exposure to antitrust 
investigations and prospective heavy sanctions, firms attempt to achieve collusive 
outcomes without resorting to explicit agreements. One mechanism that may promote 
such tacit collusion is information-sharing; that is, the otherwise competing firms 
exchange their private information in order to set and maintain supra-competitive 
prices. 
 
Thus far, the attention of the antitrust authorities and scholars has focused on the 
phenomenon of horizontal information-sharing, i.e., the exchange of information 
between rival firms that operate at the same economic level. Contrary to this body of 
work, this article focuses on the effect of vertical information-sharing on the ability of 
the firms to collude. Recently, it has been shown that when competing retailers 
disclose their private information to a mutual manufacturer, the wholesale price set by 
the latter provides a signal to the retailers. This signal allows the retailers to fix prices 
without the necessity of any direct communication between them, thereby achieving 
a collusive outcome while avoiding the risk of being exposed to the scrutiny of the 
antitrust authorities.  
 
Another fascinating aspect of the collusion achieved through vertical information-
exchange is that it can generate social costs higher than those of direct collusion. In 
other words, from the social welfare perspective, in certain instances—such as those 
discussed in this article—the social planner would be better off allowing competing 
firms to collude directly, rather than exchanging their private information via their 
mutual manufacturer.  
 
Therefore, understanding the neglected impact of vertical information-sharing is 
important not only for effective antitrust laws, but also for developing effective 
policies and regulations. Calling into focus the strategic behavior of competing 
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retailers that may produce outcomes similar—or even severer—than those resulting 
from collusive agreement based on horizontal information-sharing, this article is the 
first attempt to address the legal implications of such a scheme, while integrating the 
findings of the economic literature. In particular, this article argues that: (1) antitrust 
authorities should broaden the scope of their scrutiny to include vertical information-
sharing; and (2) case law permits such information-sharing to be condemned under 
the Sherman Act if it produces anticompetitive effects without counterbalancing pro-
competitive effects. 
 
Keywords: antitrust, tacit collusion, facilitating practices, vertical information-
sharing, price-fixing 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
There is little debate regarding the negative implications of collusion and price-
fixing for social welfare; in fact, scholars argue that the “condemnation of price fixing 
agreements is not merely seen as unproblematic but as the most central, important, 
and defensible feature of contemporary competition law.”1 The postulation that 
collusion and price-fixing should not be permitted may be “the least controversial 
                                                                                                                                         
 1  Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CAL. 
L. REV. 683, 685 (2011).  
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prohibition in competition law.”2 On the other hand, scholarly literature and policy 
both lack a precise definition of the nature of the practices that constitute collusion; 
moreover, the questions regarding how these practices should be addressed are still 
being debated.3  
In fact, commentators frequently criticize antitrust laws as being vague and 
imprecise. For instance, Lande argues that “[t]he antitrust laws are among the least 
precise statutes enacted by Congress,” because the central terms thereof “including 
‘competition,’ ‘unfair methods of competition,’ ‘conspiracy in restraint of trade,’ and 
‘monopolize’ are inherently vague and not self-defining.”4 Despite decades of 
research devoted to the investigation and analysis of collusion and price-fixing 
mechanisms, legal scholars and economic theorists have yet to provide clear 
parameters easily verifiable by antitrust enforcement agencies or the court. 
In the U.S.—as well as in many other jurisdictions5—horizontal price-fixing 
agreements between competing firms are deemed to be illegal per se.6 Horizontal 
                                                                                                                                         
 2  Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 343 
(2011). 
 3  Id.; see also William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements 
Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1993); George A. Hay, Horizontal 
Agreements: Concept and Proof, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 877 (2006).  
 4  Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: 
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 81 (1982); see also Mark A. 
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
479, 573 (1998) (observing that the antitrust statutes consist of “majestically general language 
overlapping a byzantine mixture of economic relationships”). 
 5  For instance, in the law of the European Union, Article 101(1)—formerly 81(1)—covers 
“all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices . . . which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition,” including “in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions.” Consolidated Version of Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Art. 101(1), Jan. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88.  For a 
comparison of the antitrust enforcement policies in the U.S. and Europe, see, for example, 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust  Enforcement in the United States and Europe, 1 J. 
COMP. L. & ECON. 427 (2005).  
 6  Horizontal price-fixing is illegal per se unless it is “ancillary to an economic integration 
generating a large cost savings or other efficiency, tantamount to the creation of a new product. 
Those restraints that do not fall within the per se prohibition are illegal if unreasonable.” 
Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly 
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 143-44 n.2 (1993); 
see also Jonathan B. Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Restraints, 36 
ANTITRUST BULL. 733 (1991). The antitrust law recognizes that some horizontal restraints may 
have outcomes that enhance—rather than restrict—competitiveness; however, the common 
understanding that this type of restraint tends to be more problematic underlies the distinction 
between per se illegality and the rule of reason. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 
F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).  
  It is important to distinguish between 'horizontal' restraints, i.e., agreement between 
competitors at the same level of market structure, and 'vertical' restraints, i.e., combinations of 
persons at different levels of the market structure, such as manufacturers and distributors . . . 
[h]orizontal restraints alone have been characterized as naked restraints of trade with no purpose 
except stifling competition . . . and, therefore, per se violations of the Sherman Act. On the other 
hand, while vertical restrictions may reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the numbers of 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015
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agreements—i.e., agreements between “otherwise competing entities”7—have been 
extensively examined by scholars as well as by policy-makers and antitrust 
enforcement agencies.8 Competition regimes strictly scrutinize horizontal agreements9 
and parties to such agreements are generally subject to harsh penalties. The sanctions 
for violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act—the main piece of legislation that 
is applicable to collusion and price-fixing—may include fines, prison terms, and treble 
damages to private parties.10  
While there is little controversy with respect to the negative implications of 
collusion for social welfare and the desirability of stimulating market competition,11 
cartels are inherently difficult to detect and prosecute. This complexity arises from the 
fact that the concept of agreement—which constitutes the core of antitrust conspiracy 
cases—“is elusive”12 and direct evidence of agreements to conspire is usually absent.13 
In fact, the courts have repeatedly observed that “seldom are the conspiratorial villains 
                                                                                                                                         
sellers of a particular product, competing for a given group of buyers, they also promote 
interbrand competition by allowing a manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the 
distribution of its products... they are, therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason 
standard. 
Id.  
 7  Hay, supra note 3, at 877.  
 8  Kovacic, supra note 3; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (The Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 2d ed. 2001); Michael D. Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating 
Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881 
(1979); Donald C. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating 
Devices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1983); George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared 
Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982); Richard S. Markovits, 
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare, 26 STAN. L. REV. 493 
(1974); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 1562 (1969); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: 
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962); Kaplow, supra note 
1. For a discussion of vertical agreements, see Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Leegin, The Rule of 
Reason, and Vertical Agreement (Dec. 15, 2010), U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
10-40, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1673519.   
 9  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 685. 
 10  Section 4 of the Clayton Act supplements the public enforcement sanctions by providing 
an incentive for private enforcement: “[T]hat any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . without 
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). 
 11  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Direct versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price 
Fixing, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 449 (2011).  
 12  United States v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 433, 442 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); see 
also Kaplow, supra note 1, at 729 (stating that “although it is black letter law that an agreement 
must exist in order for Section 1 to be triggered, the concept of agreement, whether viewed by 
itself or illuminated by the underlying statutory language, does little to indicate what is or should 
be required.”). 
 13  See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 27 n.75 (citing various instances in which courts recognized 
the fact that direct evidence of an express agreement is rarely available).   
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/7
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so devoid of cleverness as to broadcast their oral agreements or publicly circulate the 
written memos which describe their plan.”14 
Moreover, because the likelihood of being exposed to antitrust investigation and 
potential sanctions has “significantly increased” in the last decades,15 the business 
community reacted to the tightened antitrust enforcement methods by installing 
rigorous compliance programs to preclude suspicious practices, such as direct 
communications that constitute collusion with rival firms.16 Competing firms refrain 
from communicating and conspiring directly.17 However, it is quite conceivable that 
with the increase in the threat of detecting express collusive action, firms may have 
turned to less dangerous forms of achieving the same ends, such as signaling and other 
tactics.18  
Although the indirect schemes of collusion may be less effective than direct and 
express communications between cartel members, they are less likely to elicit 
governmental investigation and potential criminal prosecution, while potentially 
producing equivalent results.19 In some cases, practices that fall short of formal 
collusion “may be adequate substitutes,”20 in inducing collusive outcomes, such as 
supra-competitive pricing. In other words, while communications between firms are a 
central part of the operation of a cartel,21 as a result of the risk of bearing severe 
sanctions,22 firms explore alternative schemes to attain collusive outcomes without 
resorting to what the legal doctrine traditionally terms an ‘agreement.’23  
                                                                                                                                         
 14  Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 327 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 15  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 10-11 (discussing the increased likelihood that “efforts by 
competitors to coordinate their behavior through a direct exchange of assurances would be 
detected, prosecuted, and, as discussed immediately below, penalized severely” during the 
Reagan and Bush administrations). 
 16  Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Appropriate Role of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 9 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1277, 1289 (1988).   
 17  See, e.g., Clark, who asserts that due to the fact that the Sherman Act prohibits 
competitors from negotiating a consensus on pricing and output strategies, states that an 
accommodation on price and output levels “must be arrived at by means of more oblique 
methods . . . .” Clark, supra note 8, at 892.  
 18  See, e.g., Joseph Kattan, Beyond Facilitating Practices: Price Signaling and Price 
Protection Clauses in the New Antitrust Environment, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1994).  
 19  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
 20  Hay, supra note 8, at 453. 
 21  Express collusion “provides the greatest opportunity for exchange of information, 
resolution of disagreement, and communication of intentions.” Id.; see also William H. Page, 
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (2007). 
 22  William E. Kovacic, Criminal Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from 
U.S. Experience 45, in CRIMINALIZING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY MOVEMENT 66-67 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2011) (discussing modern trends in sanctions for cartel offenses). 
 23  “The expanded use of powerful means of detection—including amnesty programs that 
give certain informants full dispensation from criminal penalties—and ever stronger remedies 
will encourage firms to achieve consensus through more subtle techniques that fall short of an 
express exchange of assurances in a covert meeting.” William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015
626 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:621 
Due to competitors’ attempts to achieve collusion by indirect means, courts have 
long recognized that rarely can an express agreement be demonstrated in order to 
prove the existence of a conspiracy.24 Thus, it has been ruled that an agreement under 
the Sherman Act need not be explicit,25 express,26 or formal;27 rather “most 
conspiracies are inferred from the behavior of the alleged conspirators.”28 However, 
the courts continue to struggle with the question of what circumstantial evidence may 
suffice to justify inference of an illegal tacit agreement.29 Indeed, tacit collusion 
appears to be particularly challenging to tackle.30 In fact, despite the overall consensus 
on the negative welfare implications of collusion and price-fixing among competing 
firms, the detection and proof of the behavior that constitutes illegal collusion is 
                                                                                                                                         
Leslie M. Marx  & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors and Agreement In Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. 393, 396 (2011). 
 24  See, e.g., ES Dev. v. RWM Enters., 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 25  United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) (the Court noted that 
“it has long been settled that explicit agreement is not a necessary part of a Sherman Act 
conspiracy—certainly not where, as here, joint and collaborative action was pervasive in the 
initiation, execution, and fulfillment of the plan.”). 
 26  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (noting that “[i]t is 
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the 
arrangement.”). 
 27  Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946) (“no formal agreement 
is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy;” evidence of an antitrust violation “may be 
found in a course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any exchange of words.”). 
 28  Seafood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1573 (11th Cir. 2001) (the Court 
noted that “[I]t is only in rare cases that a plaintiff can establish the existence of a Section 1 
conspiracy by showing an explicit agreement; most conspiracies are inferred from the behavior 
of the alleged conspirators.”). 
 29  See, e.g., Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (in which the 
court stated that “[A]s is usual in cases of alleged unlawful agreements to restrain commerce, 
the Government is without the aid of direct testimony that the distributors entered into any 
agreement with each other to impose the restrictions upon subsequent-run exhibitors. In order 
to establish agreement, it is compelled to rely on inferences drawn from the course of conduct 
of the alleged conspirators.”). In Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 809-10, the Court stated that 
“[n]o formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy” and that a finding of 
conspiracy is justified “[w]here the circumstances are such as to warrant a jury in finding that 
the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of 
minds in an unlawful arrangement.”  In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 
768 (1984), the Court ruled that “[T]he correct standard is that there must be evidence that tends 
to exclude the possibility of independent action by the [parties]. That is, there must be direct or 
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that [the parties] had a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” See also In re 
Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (Judge Richard Posner 
observed, “[D]irect evidence of conspiracy is not a sine qua non . . . [c]ircumstantial evidence 
can establish an antitrust conspiracy.”). 
 30  While much debate surrounds the question of whether the relevant piece of legislation—
i.e., the Sherman Act—requires an explicit agreement or whether a mere tacit or implicit 
agreement may suffice for liability to arise, there is a general consensus that tacit collusion is 
prohibited (for an extensive discussion, see below). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/7
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exceedingly challenging31 and “inevitably imperfect.”32 As has been noted by 
commentators, collusive actions are “notoriously difficult to prove in court.”33 
Within the general challenge presented by the issues of detecting and establishing 
illegal collusion, oligopolic markets constitute a particularly difficult case.34 This is 
the case, because while the evidence of the explicit collusive agreements is usually 
scarce, it is virtually non-existent in instances when there are no agreements to collude 
in the first place, “but firms establish collusive outcomes because they understand the 
interaction of the market.”35 More specifically, the firms may coordinate their conduct 
simply by observing and reacting to their competitors’ moves, which—in turn—may 
result in parallel behavior, such as parallel price movements, leading to the results 
associated with traditional constraints of trade.  
In the absence of direct proof of conspiracy, the major challenge presented by 
inferring illegal tacit collusion from the behavior of alleged conspirators lies in 
distinguishing it from independent decision-making by profit-maximizing firms that 
simply take the actions of their rivals into account. This is an imperative, but 
exceedingly complex task.36 Courts and legal scholars have long debated the 
conceptual uncertainty and doctrinal confusion between the lawful unilateral conduct 
and illegal collective behavior.37 
As a response to the variety of tactics that are used by competing firms to reach 
collusive outcomes in the absence of express agreements, the courts have ruled that an 
agreement under Section 1 may be inferred from the evidence that the alleged 
conspirators have engaged in parallel conduct. However, in itself conscious 
parallelism—i.e., parallel movement in price—is deemed insufficient to establish that 
a concerted action has taken place, because such a pricing-scheme, while consistent 
with conspiracy, aligns with a wide swath of rational and competitive business 
                                                                                                                                         
 31  See POSNER (2001), supra note 8, at 98–99; Posner (1969), supra note 8, at 1578, 1583, 
1593.  
 32  Kaplow, supra note 2, at 362. 
 33  Kai-Uwe Kühn & Xavier Vives, Information Exchanges Among Firms and Their Impact 
on Competition (1995) (Report to the European Commission), at 112. 
 34  An oligopoly differs from a monopoly in that no one firm can unilaterally control the 
market price (e.g., by altering its own output). However, in highly concentrated markets, firms 
can control prices “by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence 
with respect to price and output decisions.” Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Co., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). 
 35  Kühn & Vives, supra note 33, at 112. 
 36  For example, Kovacic notes that “[D]espite a half-century of effort, antitrust law and 
policy have achieved only modest success in devising a satisfactory definition for the concept 
of concerted action and creating a suitable methodology for establishing the existence of an 
agreement in litigation.” Kovacic, supra note 3, at 80. 
 37  See, e.g., Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 
1270 (N.D. Ga. 2002), aff’d sub nom, Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2003); Kovacic et al., supra note 23. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015
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strategies unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.38 In light of 
the fact that the actions of firms acting independently, but responding to market 
stimuli, may resemble the actions of conspirators, the evidence of such parallel 
conduct must support a plausible theory of conspiracy and be accompanied by 
evidence of some plus factors that enable the courts to distinguish between unilateral 
and conspiratorial conduct.39   
The literature has identified a number of ways in which rival firms can coordinate 
their behavior, without resorting to express agreements.40 One such method is 
horizontal information-sharing—i.e., the exchange of private information between 
firms that operate on the same economic level—which may produce the same outcome 
as the direct price-fixing mechanism.41 This scheme allows engaging firms to 
overcome one of the major challenges facing a cartel, namely, determining the cartel’s 
price. More specifically, in an environment characterized by uncertainty, the absence 
of communication, competing firms may find it difficult to coordinate on the 
monopoly price. This lack of coordination can result in lowering the sustainability 
level of the cartel. To avoid this situation, horizontally-competing firms can exchange 
information, thereby reducing the uncertainty level in the market, which—in turn—
allows the firms to set a uniform monopoly price without resorting to an express 
agreement. Due to this positive effect of information-sharing on the sustainability of 
the cartel, some economists argue that any horizontal information-exchange between 
competing firms should be scrutinized by antitrust authorities.42   
In light of the significant consequences of horizontal information-sharing for the 
firms’ ability to form and maintain a cartel, the exchange of private information 
between competitors is considered to be a possible signal for collusion.43 In fact, “the 
communication or exchange of information . . . might lead, through coordinated or 
                                                                                                                                         
 38  ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC AND JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 267-68, (Thomson 
West, 2d ed. 2008); Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 395. 
 39  Merck-Medco Managed Care v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *8-
9 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
11-16 (ABA Publishing, 6th ed. 2007).    
 40  These schemes include such practices as augmented price leadership, pricing formulas, 
price protection and others. Hay, supra note 8, at 453. 
 41  See, e.g., Susan S. DeSanti & Ernest A. Nagata, Competitor Communications: 
Facilitating Practices or Invitations To Collude? An Application of Theories to Proposed 
Horizontal Agreements Submitted for Antitrust Review, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 121 (1994). 
 42  See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Kühn, Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between 
Firms, 16 ECON. POL’Y 167 (2001). 
 43  Steven C. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank 
Matthewson eds., MIT Press 1986); Baker (1993), supra note 6; Kovacic et al., supra note 23. 
For a general overview of the theory, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION ch. 6 (Cambridge: MIT Press 1988); STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMICS ch. 10 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2d. ed. 2002).  
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/7
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oligopolistic interdependence, to the same results the parties sought to achieve through 
their proposed formal agreement.”44  
 However, due to the fact that the direct information-sharing among competing 
firms may expose the latter to investigations for antitrust violations, with subsequent 
heavy penalties, firms often seek alternative schemes for information-sharing and 
collusion. In this article, we focus on an alternative information-sharing scheme that 
may lead to collusive outcomes, namely, vertical information-sharing in a supply 
chain.45 Collusion using vertical information-exchange refers to the scenario in which 
the competing retailers do not exchange information directly; rather, they divulge their 
private information to a mutual manufacturer. Endowed with the retailers’ private 
information, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price. This price—in turn—serves as 
a signal for the retailers, enabling them to infer each other’s private information; this 
price allows them to coordinate on the collusive price, thereby bringing about the same 
undesirable consequences as a direct information-exchange. To the best of our 
knowledge, this particular alternative mechanism of collusion between horizontally-
competing firms through information-exchange with a vertically-related firm has not 
been previously examined by the legal scholarship of antitrust.  
A number of important points should be emphasized here. First, our scenario 
differs from a simple indirect horizontal information-exchange, where rather than 
engaging in face-to-face communications, competing firms use an outside 
messenger—a third party—who conveys the contents of the information received 
from one firm to its competitor. To elaborate, in our case, the vertically-related firm—
in the model that underlies this work, this entity identified as the manufacturer—does 
not forward the contents of the data received from one firm—a retailer—to its 
competitor. Rather, the manufacturer uses this information for his personal benefit. 
However, although the information is not forwarded by the manufacturer to the 
competing firms, the latter are able to infer the information necessary for establishing 
the cartel from the manufacturer’s actions.  
Second, not only may actions of horizontally-related entities be challenged as 
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In many instances, the courts have also 
examined and condemned restraints on trade achieved by vertically-related firms, such 
as agreements between manufacturers and retailers.46 While there is an important 
difference between condemning the horizontal and the vertical agreements as being 
illegal,47 in essence, both types of agreements concentrate on the existence and the 
substance of communications: communications between the competing firms in the 
first case, and communications between firms in a vertical relationship in the latter.  
                                                                                                                                         
 44  DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 41, at 121. On the potential importance of these 
information-exchange arrangements as monitoring devices, see GAVIL ET AL., supra note 38, at 
283–301. 
 45  By vertical we mean a relationship among firms that operate at different, but connected, 
economic levels, such as a manufacturer and a retailer. 
 46  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); see, e.g., 
Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 156 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 1998); Helicopter Support Sys. v. Hughes 
Helicopter, 818 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1987); McCabe’s Furniture v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 
F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 47  In Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885, the Supreme Court overturned the traditional per se rule with 
respect to vertical relationships, stating that the appropriate measure for vertical—as opposed 
to horizontal—price restraints is the rule of reason. 
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It is important to emphasize that such vertical collusion differs from our case. 
Contrary to research in the existing literature, this article offers a new perspective on 
potential illegal horizontal collusion that is achieved through information-sharing by 
firms in a vertical relationship—i.e., exchange of information among sequential 
parties in the supply chain—when no direct collusion, or even mere direct 
communications, between the competing firms takes place. Such mechanism of 
vertical information-exchange may be employed as a signaling device that generates 
horizontal collusive price-fixing outcome between otherwise competing firms.  
Finally, it should be stressed that while the argument set forth hereafter is grounded 
in a formal mathematical model, the factual scenario that underlies it is not a mere 
figment of our imagination. To the contrary, in real life settings competing firms have 
been continuously—alas, perhaps mostly undetected—employing the scheme of 
vertical communications. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) has investigated a number of vertical information-exchange cases, such 
as Replica Football Kit,48 Toys and Games49 and others.50 Therefore, as will be 
discussed in detail hereafter, our goal here is not to imagine a theoretical, but 
unrealistic, scenario. Rather, we strive to provide sufficient grounds for the antitrust 
authorities to divert their attention to the type of collusion that has been so far escaping 
their consideration.  
Our concrete scenario focuses on competing retailers who individually share their 
private information about the estimated future market demand with their mutual 
manufacturer. As has recently been demonstrated by Shamir, the wholesale price—
which is set by the manufacturer—reflects the information he received from the 
retailers; based on the wholesale price the retailers—in turn—have been able to 
coordinate on a monopoly outcome.51 This strategy allows the retailers to fix the price 
at a desired—supra-competitive—level, while avoiding the risk of being exposed to 
antitrust investigations and prosecution. On the other hand, the retailers also avoid the 
price-cutting and price wars that may occur when the prices are based solely on the 
retailers’ own private information. Moreover, in certain instances, the social welfare 
loss resulting from collusion based on vertical information-exchange described in this 
article may be even greater than the loss generated by direct collusion.   
Shamir’s model has important implications from the perspective of the law and 
antitrust authorities. Currently, for the purposes of establishing illegal collusion, the 
antitrust enforcement agencies concentrate on horizontal information-sharing between 
competing firms by sharing their information with the manufacturer, rather than with 
                                                                                                                                         
 48  OFT Decision No. CA98/06/2003 (Aug. 1, 2003). In this case, the OFT discovered 
concerted practices to set a minimum price for certain football replica kits, achieved through 
indirect contacts between competing retailers via a mutual manufacturer.  
 49  OFT Decision No. CA98/8/2003 (Nov. 21, 2003). The OFT’s finding, subsequently 
upheld by the Competition Appeal Tribunal, included—among others—the finding that the 
pricing intentions of one retailer were disclosed by the manufacturer to the other retailer.  
 50  See, e.g., OFT Decision No. CA 98/08/2004 (Nov. 8, 2004). 
 51  Noam Shamir, Cartel Formation through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution 
Channel (July 11, 2013) (working paper) (under revision for review in Marketing Science). 
While earlier economic research assumed that if precluded from horizontal information-sharing, 
competing firms must collude using sophisticated signaling games or by ignoring their private 
information, Shamir examined whether retailers who source their product from a mutual 
manufacturer can collude using the manufacturer's wholesale price as a coordination device. 
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their rivals—i.e., vertical information-sharing.  As a result, the retailers evade the risk 
of becoming the subjects of antitrust investigation and potential sanctions, while 
achieving their collusive outcomes. This paper extends the environment in which the 
colluding firms operate by discussing how vertical information-sharing can serve as a 
tool that enables the cartel members to coordinate on collusive pricing. Specifically, 
we suggest that courts and antitrust authorities adjust the framework they currently 
use to determine the existence of concerted action based on circumstantial evidence 
by including the information-sharing in vertical relationships as well. 
Over three decades ago, Hay suggested expanding antitrust regulations to include 
indirect concerted action, arguing that firms engaging in indirect collusion by means 
of facilitating practices should face antitrust liability, because indirect and direct 
collusion are not fundamentally different.52 Hay’s argument is based on the 
observation that like formal collusion, these practices “establish the meeting of the 
minds that makes it individually rational for each firm to behave in a parallel 
noncompetitive way.”53 This ‘meeting of the minds,’ coupled with the fact that in cases 
of indirect collusion, the problem of the lack of culpability does not exist—because 
the firms have taken specific avoidable means to reach a consensus price—provides a 
coherent basis for including ‘indirect collusion’ in the antitrust enforcement policies. 
We argue that in the case of competing retailers who share their private 
information with a mutual manufacturer, both of the aforementioned elements are 
present. While there is no pre-existing ‘agreement’ between the firms, there is a 
‘meeting of the minds,’ in the sense that the competing firms both intend to follow a 
common course of action. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section II is devoted to a 
detailed discussion of the phenomenon of collusion. While some elements of the 
discussion are relevant to any type of collusion, we specifically concentrate on the 
issue of tacit collusion. The reason for this focus is due to the nature of the particular 
information-sharing scheme that is the focal point of this work—i.e., vertical 
information-sharing between competing retailers and their mutual manufacturer—
there is no explicit agreement between the otherwise competing retailers; in fact, in 
our scenario, the retailers never resort to any sort of direct communications between 
one another.  
In addition to the general description of the phenomenon of collusion, we address 
the firms’ incentives to share-information as well as the means to detect and infer 
collusive behavior that have been employed by the antitrust agencies thus far. 
Furthermore, we discuss the existing literature that deals with various plus factors 
employed by the courts in attempting to establish tacit collusion, concentrating, in 
particular, on the information-exchange as a plus factor. 
Section III discusses the phenomenon of vertical information-sharing in 
competitive settings. In this Section, we consider the literature that modeled and 
analyzed the incentives of firms to share their private information in vertical 
relationships. Specifically, we focus on the phenomenon of information leakage, 
which occurs when certain private information—such as projected market demand—
that is exchanged between two parties in a supply chain finds its way to other players 
in the market.  
                                                                                                                                         
 52  Hay, supra note 8, at 468. 
 53  Id. 
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As discussed in Section IV, information leakage may result in an outcome that 
promotes collusive behavior and price-fixing among competing retailers. 
Interestingly, in certain instances, this phenomenon can lead to a greater social welfare 
loss than the one that occurs as a result of collusion achieved by ‘traditional’ horizontal 
information-exchange. In other words, paradoxically, the social planner would be 
better-off allowing the competing retailers to sit at the table and exchange their private 
information directly, than having them share this information vertically with their 
mutual manufacturer due to their fear of being exposed to the antitrust sanctions.   
While antitrust enforcement agencies currently focus their attention and resources 
on detecting and investigating the instances of horizontal information-sharing, we 
argue that some instances of vertical exchanges of information should be included in 
the enforcement efforts. We argue that applying the same economic principles that 
govern horizontal information-sharing to the vertical settings would permit the courts 
to condemn certain practices of vertical communications in instances that currently 
elude their focus. We leave it to future research to consider—and suggest—whether 
new tools should be applied to the settings of vertical information-sharing. 
In Section V, we conclude with final remarks and policy recommendations with 
respect to the potential antitrust consequences of vertical information-sharing in 
supply chains. 
II. COLLUSION 
A. The Concept of Agreement and Oligopoly  
The relevant piece of legislation that addresses collusion is the Sherman Act of 
1890.54 Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares to be illegal “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy[] in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”55 It should be noted that while the original prohibition addresses 
‘contracts,’ ‘combinations’ and ‘conspiracies,’ the courts do not make distinctions 
between these terms. As Posner observes, “the courts sensibly have not worried about 
whether the terms ‘contract,’ ‘combination,’ and ‘conspiracy,’ in section 1, have 
nonoverlapping meanings.”56  
However, the attempts of the antitrust law to determine the legitimacy of actions 
by assessing whether they conform to the term ‘agreement’ have been widely 
criticized both for being vague,57 and for being inappropriate from the vantage point 
                                                                                                                                         
 54  For further historical background on the enactment of the Sherman Act, see Michael A. 
Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1294-98 
(1999). 
 55  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Also, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 
§ 45) challenges the conduct prohibited by Section 1 as “unfair methods of competition.” The 
courts have interpreted Section 5 to include behavior beyond the reach of Section l. See Kovacic, 
supra note 3, at 15 nn.38-39 and accompanying text.  For the purpose of Section 5, no proof of 
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” is necessary; thus, commentators 
argued that it can be used as a mechanism to attack facilitating practices and forms of inter-firm 
coordination that may defy characterization as an agreement for Sherman Act purposes. Baker 
(1993), supra note 6; Clark, supra note 8.  
 56  POSNER (2001), supra note 8, at 262. 
 57  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 728 (stating that the definition is “reminiscent of a common 
legal drafting technique that strives to be all-inclusive.”); see also Aaron Director & Edward H. 
Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 295 (1956) (“the serious 
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of economics.58 For one, economic analysis focuses on the quality of conduct and its 
potential tendency to exploit market power or exclude competitors; whether the 
conduct is a result of collusive or unilateral action has no direct bearing on its quality.59 
In contrast, to fall within the scope of the antitrust laws, behavior must either be 
monopolistic or collusive; therefore, the distinction between collusive and unilateral 
conduct is central to legal analysis.60  
Another critique of the formalistic approach with respect to the antitrust 
authorities’ definition of the illegal collusion concerns the social welfare implications. 
It has been rightly noted that the negative consequences that price-fixing has on social 
welfare do not depend on the means by which the collusive outcome was 
accomplished. Whether the supra-competitive prices were reached through recognized 
interdependence—when competing firms rationally and independently respond to 
market stimuli—or following a secret meeting, its results are undesirable.61 
Oligopolistic markets—which are dominated by a few firms powerful enough to 
influence the market price by controlling most of the sales62—present a special 
challenge to antitrust regulations and policies. The problem of collusion in such 
markets is exacerbated by the market structure, which facilitates collective behavior.63 
                                                                                                                                         
problem of collusion is to determine what conduct is to be characterized as the equivalent of an 
agreement . . . .”). 
 58  Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Communication Among 
Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1997) (arguing 
that there is “no economic theory of the meaning of ‘agreement’ wherein one may determine 
easily when communication leads to anticompetitive results irrespective of the context of the 
events.”). In fact, Hay maintains that these two disciplines have fundamentally different 
conceptual approaches; the efforts to incorporate economic concepts into the legal doctrine have 
been “counter-productive” because they generated “confusion and inconsistencies.” Hay, supra 
note 8, at 440.  For a discussion of the inapplicability of the term ‘agreement’ from the law of 
contracts or economics, see William H. Page, Facilitating Practices and Concerted Action 
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (Keith N. Hylton ed., 
Edward Elgar Publ’g Ltd. 2d ed. 2010).   
 59  Markovits, supra note 8; Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 
73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983). 
 60  Peter C. Carstensen, Commentary: Reflections on Hay, Clark, and the Relationship of 
Economic Analysis and Policy to Rules of Antitrust Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 953 (1983); see 
also Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 435 (arguing that “[T]he resolution of many antitrust cases 
hinges on the determination of whether observed conduct is the product of unilateral behavior 
or collective action.”). Baker observed that “[b]y operationalizing the idea of an agreement, 
antitrust law clarified that the idea of an agreement describes a process that firms engage in, not 
merely the outcome that they reach. Not every parallel pricing outcome constitutes an agreement 
because not every such outcome was reached through the process to which the law objects: a 
negotiation that concludes when the firms convey mutual assurances that the understanding they 
reached will be carried out.” Baker (1993), supra note 6, at 179. 
 61  Kaplow, supra note 11.  
 62  George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39 (The 
Univ. of Chicago Press 1968). 
 63  Philipp E. Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics 50, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN 
TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Eleanor M. Ox & James T. 
Halverston eds., Am. Bar Assn. 1984); ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST 
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Firms in concentrated markets are more likely to attempt—and to succeed in 
creating—collusion, than firms in less concentrated markets.64 In fact, scholars predict 
that due to the high levels of concentration in many segments of the U.S. market, 
collusion will be a continuing problem.65  
Specifying the standards for regulating the anticompetitive behavior of firms in 
oligopolistic markets continues to present a challenge for the antitrust policy-makers:66 
“for more than 100 years, the courts and antitrust enforcement agencies have struggled 
unsuccessfully to regulate the anticompetitive conduct of oligopolists.”67 It appears to 
be impossible to point to an economic distinction between a meeting to fix prices and 
“a situation in which two firms are sitting at their computer terminals rapidly changing 
prices in response to the others’ actions.”68 While the economic theory of oligopoly is 
not incompatible with the possibility that the otherwise competing firms would reach 
a consensus to secure noncompetitive prices as a result of an actual ‘agreement,’ it 
suggests that the same supra-competitive prices can emerge as a result of a rational 
pricing strategy, i.e., conscious parallelism.69 In other words, competition, consumer 
preferences, or market conditions—rather than conspiring with each other—force the 
firms to act in a manner similar to a consort action. 
                                                                                                                                         
ECONOMICS (2d. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008); see also KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 73 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
 64  Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. 
ECON. LIT. 43, 57 (2006).  
 65  Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct under the Antitrust Laws, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 9, 11 (2004). 
 66  ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 102-04 
(New York: Basic Books Inc. 1978). See generally BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 63; see also 
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century, 9 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 97, 97 (1997) (“Three troubling phenomena attend current efforts to attack 
collusion and will beset future enforcement programs. One is substantial conceptual uncertainty 
and doctrinal confusion about how to distinguish between lawful unilateral conduct and illegal 
collective behavior.”); Alan Devlin, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Parallel 
Pricing in Oligopolistic Markets, 59 STAN L. REV. 1111, 1112 n.1 (2007) (quoting Daniel R. 
Shulman, Proof of Conspiracy in Antitrust Cases and the Oligopoly Problem, 4 SEDONA CONF. 
J 1, 1 (2003)) (“Proof of conspiracy in antitrust cases has become one of the more muddled areas 
of antitrust law.”). 
 67  Piraino, supra note 65, at 9. 
 68  Carlton et al., supra note 58, at 437. 
 69  HYLTON, supra note 63, at 73. More specifically, firms—recognizing their 
interdependence with the competitors—would individually accommodate their prices to reflect 
their rational analysis of other market players. Hylton explains that “the term conscious 
parallelism refers to a form of tacit collusion in which each firm in an oligopoly realizes that it 
is within the interests of the entire group of firms to maintain a high price or to avoid vigorous 
price competition, and the firms act in accordance with this realization.” Id. Hans-Theo 
Normann, Conscious Parallelism in Asymmetric Oligopoly, 51 METROECONOMICA 343, 343 
(2000) (“Conscious parallelism describes forms of tacitly collusive conduct in oligopoly. Firms 
engage in parallel behaviour in order to gain collusive profits. A cartel is not set up explicitly; 
instead, firms establish parallel conduct understanding the accomplishment of a common 
purpose.”); see also D.J. Simonetti, Note, Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An 
Analysis and Proposal, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1977).  
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Whether the objective of competition policy is the maximization of consumers’ 
welfare,70 or the overall efficiency or social welfare71—which includes producers’ 
profits as well—oligopoly pricing is generally regarded to be undesirable in itself.72 
After all, from the economic perspective, whether supra-competitive pricing is 
“achieved by direct agreement or sophisticated conscious parallelism,”73 it results in 
the same economic harm.74 “The core objection to oligopoly pricing is that prices are 
higher: higher than the competitive level and higher than is ordinarily necessary to 
induce producers to supply goods and services to consumers.”75  
Moreover, the collusive behavior of firms in an oligopolistic market may, in fact, 
be more harmful to consumers than an overt price-fixing cartel, because the latter is 
easier to detect and penalize; it is also more prone to being undermined by cheating.76 
On the other hand, tacit coordination among oligopolists is difficult to discover, and 
their collusive conduct is likely to be sustained for a longer period of time.77  
                                                                                                                                         
 70  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (stating that the Sherman Act creates 
a “consumer welfare prescription”). See generally Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 745 (2004). 
 71  BORK, supra note 66, at 263. For a summary of opinions, see generally Lande, supra note 
4; TIROLE, supra note 43. 
 72  In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court stated that 
[T]he Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty 
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the 
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the 
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive 
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that 
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition. 
Id.; see also Kaplow, supra note 11, at 458-59; Kaplow, supra note 1, at 810. This objection to 
oligopoly pricing is that it is akin to monopoly pricing, because if instead of competing, multiple 
rival firms successfully engage in interdependent oligopolistic coordination, they act as if they 
were a single firm, reaping monopoly profits at the expense of consumers and, as explained, 
total efficiency or welfare. 
 73  W.T. Stanbury & G.B. Reschenthaler, Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: Theory, 
Policy and the Canadian Cases, 15 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 617, 688 (1977). 
 74  Shulman, supra note 66, at 14 (“[F]rom an economic standpoint, supracompetitive 
pricing achieved by oligopolists engaging in conscious parallelism is equally as abhorrent and 
destructive of efficiency as is explicit unlawful price-fixing.”). 
 75  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 810; see also Stephen A. Nye, Can Conduct Oriented 
Enforcement Inhibit Conscious Parallelism?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 206, 206 (1975) (arguing that 
“it is widely understood to be an objective of antitrust policy to forestall oligopolistic pricing. 
The question is how.”). 
 76  Piraino, supra note 65, at 12-13. 
 77  Id. at 12-13, 30 (arguing that tacit collusion is more durable and more difficult to discover 
in oligopoly than in an explicit price-fixing cartel, because “tacit price-fixing arrangements 
spring from the very nature of oligopolistic markets, they are likely to persist for long periods 
of time.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (The 
Univ. of Chicago Press 2001) (pointing out that oligopolists are more likely to collude without 
an express communication); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX L. 
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Despite the negative consequences of oligopoly pricing, a debate about the issue 
of whether oligopolists’ coordinated actions are prohibited under the Sherman Act has 
long been central to the antitrust literature. In this respect, we should mention the 
famous Turner-Posner debate. Turner offered two reasons for his view that conscious 
parallelism—i.e., parallel movement in price—in itself does not constitute an illegal 
agreement under Section 1.78 First, Turner argued, conscious parallelism concerns 
situations in which the competing firms are acting rationally based on available market 
information.79 The second reason focuses on the potential remedy: an attempt to 
preclude such economically rational conduct would require the court to draft an 
injunction requiring competing firms to act irrationally.80 Other commentators, who 
support the view that interdependent oligopoly pricing should be legal, base their 
opinion on the fact that price elevation by monopolists is permitted.81 
Posner, on the other hand, reasoned that because tacit collusion requires voluntary 
conscious choices on the part of the participants, it should be viewed as “a form of 
concerted action.” In his opinion, this behavior could be remedied by the law without 
“telling oligopolists to behave irrationally.”82 
                                                                                                                                         
REV. 515, 564-65 (2004) (arguing that the small number of firms in concentrated markets 
promote trust among the cartel members, which—in turn—helps in creating and a maintaining 
cartel). 
 78  For instance, when parallel pricing is present along with firms adopting the same 
facilitating practice. Turner, supra note 8, at 675-76; POSNER, supra note 77, at 98-99. The 
difference between such a case and simple parallel pricing lies in the fact that in the case of the 
parallel adoption of a facilitating practice that permits noncompetitive pricing the problem of 
remedy is mitigated. 
 79  Turner, supra note 8, at 671 (concluding that “oligopolists who take into account the 
probable reactions of competitors in setting their basic prices, without more in the way of 
‘agreement’ than is found in ‘conscious parallelism,’ should not be held unlawful conspirators 
under the Sherman Act.”). 
 80  Turner argued that an injunction that prohibits firms from taking competitors’ market 
behavior into account in designing their business strategies “would demand such irrational 
behavior that full compliance would be virtually impossible.” Id. at 669. Furthermore, Turner 
argues that courts cannot impose a legal obligation to determine a price upon a theoretical 
economic view of competitive results, i.e., a price equal to marginal cost. Among all other 
objections, enforcement of such an obligation by a court would resemble public utility 
regulation and would be quite inappropriate or impossible for a district court, and entirely out 
of keeping with the goals of antitrust. Id. at 670. 
 81  PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 232, 272 (2d ed. New 
York: Aspen Law & Bus. 2003) (arguing against prohibition of pure interdependence because 
such would be inconsistent with rules on monopoly); see also Turner, supra note 8, at 668 
(arguing that “[I]t would make no sense to deprive lawful oligopolists—those who have 
achieved their position by accidental events or estimable endeavor—of the natural consequence 
of their position if the lawful monopolist is left with his.”). For a critique of this view, see John 
E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner’s Try, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 843, 854–55 
(1996); Kaplow, supra note 11, at 461-62. 
 82  POSNER, supra note 77, at 94, 96-97; Posner (1969), supra note 8, at 1592 (arguing that 
coordinated pricing by oligopolists should be prohibited and that “[B]usinessmen should have 
no difficulty . . . in determining when they are behaving noncompetitively. Tacit collusion is 
not an unconscious state.”). In his decision in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust 
Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 661-65 (7th Cir. 2002), Judge Posner reversed summary judgment 
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Courts have largely adopted Turner’s reasoning on this question.83 Recently, in the 
Twombly decision,84 the Supreme Court held that to establish illegal collusion, the 
antitrust plaintiffs must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that 
an agreement was made,”85 asserting that parallel conduct is “consistent with 
conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive 
business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”86   
Therefore, in order to establish illegal tacit collusion, proof of the mere conscious 
parallel behavior of competing firms is insufficient. We further discuss the issues of 
defining and establishing the fact of tacit collusion in the next sections.87  
B. Tacit Collusion Defined 
The concept of agreement is central to the doctrine of liability under Section 1.88 
While in its early antitrust decisions, the courts rarely posed the question of whether 
the requisite agreement existed—focusing, instead, on whether Sherman Act 
condemns particular agreements89—later antitrust litigation recognized that indirect 
means of communication may be sufficient to constitute an agreement.90 In an often-
cited piece, the Supreme Court ruled that the “[a]cceptance by competitors, without 
                                                                                                                                         
using circumstantial evidence to infer a possible illegal price-fixing agreement among suppliers 
of corn syrup. 
 83  William H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted 
Action Under The New Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 439, 443-44 nn.26-28 and 
accompanying text (2009). 
 84  For an interpretation and analysis of Twombly as an antitrust decision, see Alvin K. 
Klevorick & Issa B. Kohler-Hausmann, The Plausibility of Twombly: Proving Horizontal 
Agreements After Twombly, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
(Einer R. Elhauge ed., Edward Elgar Pub 2010). 
 85  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, at 555 (2007); see also Iqbal v. Hasty, 
490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 86  Id. at 1964. 
 87  We concentrate on tacit collusion because due to the nature of the collusion scheme that 
is the focal point of this work—i.e., vertical information-sharing between competing retailers 
and their mutual manufacturer—no explicit agreement between the firms exists. 
 88  In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984), the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the ‘agreement’ element of Section 1 of Sherman Act limits 
the restraints of trade to those that are  more likely to be harmful.  
[C]oncerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk . . . . In any 
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately 
are combining to act as one for their common benefit . . . . Of course, such mergings of 
resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive 
potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.  
Id.  
 89  United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. 
Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
 90  As Page observes: “[T]he interpretive conundrum concerning the meaning of agreement 
arises when informal patterns of conduct in oligopoly mimic the effects of an express cartel.” 
Page, supra note 58, at 24. 
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previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence 
of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an 
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.”91   
The courts have continuously found that collusion need not be explicit.92 Rather, 
tacit collusion may suffice in order to establish collusive behavior.93 This finding 
appears to be logical in light of the apparent consensus among economists that tacit 
price-fixing may be just as harmful as explicit price-fixing agreements.94 In fact, 
competing firms engaged in tacit collusion are able to replicate the conditions that 
occur under an explicit cartel by reaching a consensus on supra-competitive prices and 
by adopting a means of enforcing adherence to that consensus.95  
A significant difficulty that characterizes the practice of tacit collusion in 
oligopolistic markets is its durability, which is due to two factors.96 First, price-fixing 
arrangements are embedded in the very nature of oligopolistic markets; game theory 
suggests that firms in an oligopoly will naturally gravitate toward an implicit 
consensus price.97 Second, not only may tacit collusion be more durable than express 
collusion, it is also more difficult to detect and to prosecute, because the evidence of 
conspiracy between the firms is indirect and notoriously ambiguous.98  
An additional predicament of the tacit collusion in an oligopoly is distinguishing 
illegal consort action from independent conduct. This task has proven to be 
challenging,99 because the distinction between an illegal tacit agreement and 
recognized interdependence100 is elusive, and the use of the term itself by the courts 
has been inconsistent.101 In fact, the difficulty of distinguishing tacit collusion from 
                                                                                                                                         
 91  Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). 
 92  E.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966). 
 93  For instance, in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651 (7th 
Cir. 2002), Judge Posner recognized that tacit agreement may suffice for the purposes of Section 
1: “Section 1 of the Sherman act forbids contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restriction 
of trade. This statutory language is broad enough . . . to encompass a purely tacit agreement to 
fix prices, that is, an agreement made without any actual communication among the parties to 
the agreement.”   
 94  See generally BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 63. 
 95  Hay, supra note 8, at 446-7 (arguing that firms engaged in tacit coordination can reach a 
mutual understanding of the price and a mutual sense of confidence that all firms will adhere to 
that price). 
 96  Piraino, supra note 65, at 12-13, 30. 
 97  Hay, supra note 8. 
 98  Piraino, supra note 65, at 30. 
 99  See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 734 and accompanying text.  
 100  “The analytical problem is that there is a ‘no man’s land’ between the traditional 
agreement and tacit coordination through recognized interdependence.” Dennis A. Yao & Susan 
S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 
115 n.8 (1993) (quoting PHILIPPE AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1410c (1986)).  
 101  For instance, see Hay, supra note 3, at 891–5 (discussing the lack of clarity of the term 
‘tacit agreement’ as used by the courts); Kovacic, supra note 3 (discussing courts’ varying usage 
of the term tacit agreement); Page, supra note 83, at 449-50 nn.71-7 and accompanying text. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/7
2015] COLLUDING UNDER THE RADAR 639 
 
independent conduct is exacerbated in oligopoly markets, which are characterized by 
interdependence and parallel behavior.102   
In other words, the complexity of establishing the existence of tacit agreement lies 
in the fact that the market outcome that appears to be inconsistent with vigorous 
competition—such as prices above the competitive level—may result from a tacit 
agreement, but they also may be generated by the market forces that are characteristic 
of an oligopoly.103 Firms may be able to achieve “cartel-like results without any 
explicit communication, but they may be found to have engaged in or achieved a ‘tacit’ 
agreement that is prohibited by the Sherman Act.”104 
Some scholars regard the distinction between express and tacit agreements as an 
effort to identify differences in the types of evidence needed to establish the fact of 
collusive behavior, where the first usually involve direct evidence—such as a written 
agreement—while the latter is based on circumstantial evidence.105 For instance, 
Kovacic argues that, “the crucial policy issue in such matters is how courts define the 
minimum quantum of indirect proof that will suffice to permit an inference that the 
defendants have exchanged assurances.”106  
Courts have not been consistent in their attitudes towards the instances of tacit 
collusion. In fact, scholars have continuously critiqued the courts’ failed efforts to 
articulate a coherent and unambiguous formula for antitrust liability.107 We tackle the 
                                                                                                                                         
 102  For instance, in Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 227 
(1993), the Supreme Court noted that  
Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious 
parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a 
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a 
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic 
interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions. 
Id.; see also In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350, 358-9 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing 
that courts have been “cautious” when required to establish anticompetitive actions involving 
firms in oligopolistic markets, because of the “interdependence” by which such markets are 
characterized).  
 103  See, e.g., Blechman, supra note 8. 
 104  Hay, supra note 3, at 892. Similarly, Kai-Uwe Kühn and Xavier Vives define tacit 
collusion as “any type of cooperation between firms which is not sustained by legally 
enforceable contracts,” arguing that “[t]he theories do not distinguish between explicit 
‘agreements’ between firms and implicit anticipation of reactions by rivals in dynamic 
interactions (as for example in what is termed ‘conscious parallelism’ in the competition policy 
literature). This is because in theory there is no significant difference between these two types 
of behavior (sic).” Kühn & Vives, supra note 33, at 43. Cf. Hay, supra note 8 (discussing two 
elements for liability: ‘meeting of the minds’ and culpability); see also Kaplow, supra note 1, 
at 769, n.200 and accompanying text (citing ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST 
COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 66 (ABA 
Publishing 2005) (agreements include “written agreements, verbal agreements and even tacit 
understandings that are reached through a course of conduct or other form of communication”). 
 105  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 19. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Hay, supra note 8, at 465; Lee Goldman, Trouble for Private Enforcement of the 
Sherman Act: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and the Oligopoly Problem, 2008 BYU L. REV. 
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issue of the detection and the required standard of proving tacit collusion in the next 
section. 
C. Detecting and Establishing Tacit Collusion 
Detection of collusive behavior has proven to be a laborious task; the detection 
and proof of the fact of tacit collusion is even more so. In fact, many scholars hold the 
view that “despite more than a century of litigation under the Sherman Act and the 
ability to draw on almost two centuries of economic theory, the federal courts have 
been unable to develop an effective means of regulating oligopolists’ tacit 
collusion.”108 
The legal theory was challenged by the concerns that the traditional concept of 
conspiracy was outdated and that parallel conduct by firms in an oligopoly was the 
economic equivalent of conspiracy.109 Courts have continuously struggled with 
formulating a satisfactory conceptual basis for distinguishing firms’ permissible 
unilateral interdependent behavior from illegal collective action in the absence of 
direct evidence. Baker describes the central question of the debate: “with nothing more 
in the evidentiary record than parallel price increases and an oligopoly setting, should 
a § 1 agreement to restrain prices be inferred?”110 Commentators argue that the courts’ 
efforts to address this question “have been largely unsuccessful, producing a confused 
series of opinions that provide little guidance on when antitrust liability will be 
found.”111  
Beginning with Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,112 courts have struggled 
with definition of consorted action. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
“[a]cceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to 
participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of 
interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the 
Sherman Act.”113    
Less than a decade after Interstate Circuit, Inc., in the 1946 case American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States,114 the Court stated that if “the circumstances are such as 
to warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common 
design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement,” no 
formal agreement is necessary to establish collusive behavior.115 
                                                                                                                                         
1057, 1057 (2008) (“Courts and commentators have long struggled with the proper treatment 
of parallel conduct by competitors in oligopoly markets.”). 
 108  Piraino, supra note 65, at 24. 
 109  Blechman, supra note 8, at 882. 
 110  Baker (1993), supra note 6, at 171. 
 111  Hay, supra note 8, at 465. 
 112  Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). 
 113  Id. at 227. 
 114  328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
 115  Id. at 809-10. 
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A few years later, in the case United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,116 the 
Court again asserted that “[i]t is not necessary to find an express agreement in order 
to find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the 
defendants conformed to the arrangement.”117  
In the 1954 case of Theatre Enterprises, the Court ruled that “[c]ircumstantial 
evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the 
traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not read 
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.”118 While commentators debated whether 
the findings of this case suggest that proof of parallel behavior does not, ipso facto, 
entitle a plaintiff to a directed verdict,119 most decisions after Theatre Enterprises have 
applied a rule of ‘conscious parallelism plus,’ requiring the presentation of some 
additional circumstantial evidence, in addition to the fact of the firms’ uniform 
conduct—such as parallel price move—in order to establish conspiracy. 
Thus, the courts were able to establish concerted action in which inter-firm 
coordination effectuated by means other than a direct exchange of assurances was 
present. The courts also allowed agreements to be inferred by circumstantial evidence 
if the challenged behavior, more likely than not, resulted from a collectively 
established course of action. Finally, the courts declined to find concerted action where 
the evidence suggested nothing more than the fact that the competing firms had 
recognized the influence of their own pricing decisions on the profitability and conduct 
of their rivals and mimicked their competitors’ pricing moves. 
Subsequent judicial decisions attempted to construct a formula to define these 
principles. In 1984, in the case of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp, the Court 
ruled that collusion requires some conscientious commitment to a common scheme, 
ruling that “there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent 
action by the [parties]. That is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that 
reasonably tends to prove that [the parties] had a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.”120  
However, the proposed standards and conventional legal formulas failed to provide 
meaningful analytical guidance for identifying conduct that constitutes illegal 
collusion.121 While the concept of collective action encompasses more than a written 
document or a face-to-face exchange of assurances, it offers no tools to effectively 
distinguish between the instances of collusion and when the competing firms have 
                                                                                                                                         
 116  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) 
 117  Id. at 142. 
 118  Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). In this 
case, the Court left open the question of whether consciously parallel behavior, in itself, would 
be sufficient to establish conspiracy.  
 119  See, e.g., Nye, supra note 75. 
 120  Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
 121  Baker (1993), supra note 6; Yao & DeSanti, supra note 100; Carstensen, supra note 60, 
at 962 (observing that commentators have failed to provide “a clear standard to separate 
unlawful collusion from permissible interdependency”; concluding that “[t]he courts have 
sought, with a similar lack of success, to find legal criteria to determine the existence of an 
unlawful combination.”); Page, supra note 21, at 410-23. 
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merely engaged in consciously parallel conduct.122 Moreover, as Kaplow notes, 
“because parties may reap great profits if they are on one side of the line (even if just 
barely) but suffer stiff penalties if they are on the other side (even slightly), their 
strategic anticipatory behavior places great pressure on the boundary, wherever it is 
drawn.”123 
This problem arises when mistaken inferences of collusive behavior from 
ambiguous evidence deter pro-competitive or benign conduct. In fact, it was “the goal 
of reducing error costs associated with excessively broad application of liability 
standards”124 that led the Supreme Court in Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.125 to expand Monsanto's conspiracy standards. The Court ruled 
that “antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence 
in a Section 1 case,” emphasizing that “conduct as consistent with permissible 
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference 
of antitrust conspiracy.”126 
In its recent decision in the case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme 
Court repeated that an agreement requires a “meeting of the minds” and that parallel 
conduct is “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of 
rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common 
perceptions of the market.”127 The Court clarified that when competing firms 
coordinate their actions by conscious parallelism, they act independently as a matter 
of law.128 
The fact that in oligopolistic markets, firms’ independent decision-making takes 
the likely reactions of their competitors into account is problematic for the antitrust 
analysis. Although whether the supra-competitive prices are established following 
firms engaging in true collusive behavior, or by practicing conscious parallelism—
i.e., individually adapting their conduct to that of their competitors—“the effect on the 
market is identical,”129 the lack of explicit agreement seemingly creates a problem for 
antitrust law.130  
Even ignoring the issue of the remedy—i.e., how the antitrust agencies should 
instruct firms to avoid conduct that is in their own independent best interest131—the 
                                                                                                                                         
 122  Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 401. 
 123  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 690 
 124  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 29. 
 125  475 U.S. 574 (1986). The case of Matsushita involved an alleged conspiracy to charge 
predatory prices, which is a highly improbable phenomenon.  
 126  Id. at 588. 
 127  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 128  However, it should be noted that by applying the Twombly decision to the antitrust issues 
and its consequences for future antitrust disputes are viewed as equivocal by many scholars. For 
an extensive discussion of these issues see, Kaplow, supra note 1. 
 129  Enrico Adriano Raffaelli, Oligopolies and Antitrust Law, 19(3) FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 915, 
917-8 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
 130  Reza Dibadj, Conscious Parallelism Revisited, 47(3) SAN DIEGO L. REV. 589 (2010). 
 131  For instance, in Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st 
Cir. 1988) the court noted that  
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distinction between an independent business decision—one that is based on 
assessments of competitors’ likely behavior and promotes the firm’s own best strategy 
given the market circumstances—and collusive behavior is extremely complicated.132 
Indeed, “the line that distinguishes tacit agreements (which are subject to section 1 
scrutiny) from mere tacit coordination attained through recognized oligopolistic 
interdependence (which eludes section 1's reach) is decidedly indistinct.”133 
This problem arises when the only observable parameter for the antitrust 
enforcement agencies is the market outcome—e.g., parallel price movements. While 
the effect of oligopolistic coordination is parallel behavior that “approaches the results 
that one might associate with a traditional agreement to set prices, output levels, or 
other conditions of trade,”134 differentiating it from illegal collusive agreements based 
on market data is extremely difficult. Some economists even argue that inferring 
collusive behavior from market data is virtually impossible, since the relevant market 
data is not available to antitrust authorities.135 
                                                                                                                                         
individual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its own decision upon its belief 
that competitors do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under section 1 
of the Sherman Act . . . . That is not because such pricing is desirable (it is not), but 
because it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy for 
‘interdependent’ pricing. How does one order a firm to set its prices without regard to 
the likely reactions of its competitors? 
Id.; see also Posner (1969), supra note 8, at 1564; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH 
E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 131 (Mass. Inst. Tech. Press, 
3d ed. 2000) (arguing that although the outcome of tacit collusion is just as harmful “as if the 
firms operated a cartel,” the remedies under antitrust laws “would probably need to differ” 
because “tacit understandings might require a structure dissolution of the industry to be made 
ineffective”); Goldman, supra note 107, at 1080. 
 132  An addition to the difficulty pointed out by Hay is that liability in the antitrust context 
“normally requires some form of culpable behavior,” but in oligopoly, “the firm has done 
nothing more than to conclude that it would be foolish to charge less than a ‘monopoly’ price” 
Hay, supra note 8, at 441. 
 133 Kovacic, supra note 3, at 35. 
 134  Id. at 31. 
 135  See, e.g., Kühn & Vives, supra note 33; Kühn, supra note 42, at 171 (contending that 
“[I]t is typically impossible for a court to establish with any accuracy whether oligopolists have 
charged prices close to monopoly prices or not. In the vast majority of cases, the available data 
will not allow making such inferences.”); MOTTA M., COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); see also Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: 
The Joint Executive Committee, 14 BELL J. ECON. 301 (1983) (studies by Porter and Ellison, 
who demonstrate the difficulty of inferring collusion from market data; based on the same 
market data, the authors reached opposite conclusions with respect to the existence of a railroad 
cartel in the U.S. in 1880s); Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive 
Committee, 25 RAND J. ECON. 37 (1994); Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, 
Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION vol. 3, 452 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,Amsterdam: North-Holland 1989) (Jacquemin 
and Slade argue that “[I]t is impossible to distinguish pure tacit collusion from . . . explicit cartel 
agreements. What matters for the empirical estimates is the outcome and not the cause of 
noncompetitive pricing.”); Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Collusion, in ISSUES IN 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY vol. 2, 1071 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., Chicago: ABA Publishing 
2008) (Porter and Zona, assert that “[A]s a matter of economics, it is difficult and perhaps 
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Moreover, using the conventional economic theory of oligopoly in attempting to 
establish antitrust liability may be challenging, because this model:  
[I]s premised on separate profit-maximizing decisions by each firm that 
treat the likely reaction of rivals simply as a parameter, virtually precludes 
any extension of antitrust beyond situations where formal conspiracy can 
be proved. Liability is avoided because in the standard model, nothing that 
the individual oligopolist has done appears to be culpable; its decision-
making merely takes into account the assumed reaction of rivals.136   
Following the Matsushita and Twombly rulings, if the observed parallelism is as 
consistent with independent action—i.e., a response to interdependence—as is the 
case with the presence of collusive behavior, antitrust intervention would be 
precluded. Thus, evidence of parallel conduct without additional factors is insufficient, 
as a matter of law, to meet the burden of proof for finding a conspiracy. Moreover, in 
Twombly the Supreme Court held that the allegations of an illegal collusion must be 
“placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely 
parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action,” thereby ruling that the 
plaintiff must allege some plausible ground for thinking the parallel conduct is the 
result of a conspiracy.137 
In their attempt to address the challenge posed by the issue of whether parallel 
conduct is sufficient to support an inference of agreement, the courts generally have 
held that conscious parallelism or oligopolistic interdependence does not permit an 
inference of conspiracy, unless supported by additional factors, often termed plus 
factors.138 These factors comprise the “extra ingredient of centralized orchestration of 
policy which will carry parallel action over the line into the forbidden zone of implied 
contract and combination.”139 
Unfortunately, “the analysis of plus factors is one of the most unsettled and 
perplexing doctrinal issues of modern antitrust law.”140 Types of behavior that may 
                                                                                                                                         
impossible to distinguish between [interdependent oligopoly, conscious parallelism, tacit 
collusion, and explicit collusion] on the basis of outcomes alone.”). 
 136  Hay, supra note 8, at 480; see also Kovacic, supra note 3, at 31 (maintaining that “the 
recognition of interdependence can lead firms to coordinate their conduct simply by observing 
arid reacting to the moves of their competitors. In some instances, the effect of such oligopolistic 
coordination is parallel behavior (e.g., parallel price movements) that approaches the results that 
one might associate with a traditional agreement to set prices, output levels, or other conditions 
of trade.”).  
 137  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007). 
 138  See, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032-34 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (the Court granted defendant summary judgment because plaintiff did not meet its 
burden “to present evidence of consciously paralleled pricing supplemented with one or more 
plus factors”); see also Kovacic, supra note 3, at 31 n.91 and accompanying text; Piraino, supra 
note 65, at 37; Blechman, supra note 8, at 885 n.25 and accompanying text (Blechman reports 
that the term plus factors was first used in an antitrust conspiracy context in C-O-Two Fire 
Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952)).   
 139  L.B. SCHWARTZ, J.J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST 439 (Foundation Press, 6th ed. 1983). 
 140  Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 435. 
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constitute plus factors vary. Courts enjoy broad discretion to interpret the ‘extra 
ingredient’ broadly or narrowly,141 so much that some observers argue that the 
disparities in the outcomes of cases where the courts had to interpret plus factors 
suggest that they depend upon the court’s “unarticulated intuition about the likely 
cause of observed parallel behavior.”142  
We explore the nature and the role of the plus factors and the phenomenon of 
interdependent behavior in depth in the following sub-section. 
D. Interdependence and the Role of ‘Plus Factors’ 
1. The ‘Plus Factors’ 
The economic literature has recognized that in repeated interactions in an 
oligopoly industries market-outcomes that resemble collusive schemes can result from 
the interdependent, consciously parallel conduct of the firms, rather than from actual 
conspiracy.143 Kühn and Vives describe this problem as follows: “a firm knows that 
other firms know when it acquires information and it knows that these firms act 
according to that knowledge. If a firm knows that another firm has just acquired the 
information it has itself it will change its behaviour [sic] accordingly.”144 
However, because distinguishing collusive action from independent rational 
response to market stimuli based on parallel conduct alone is difficult, if not 
unfeasible,145 courts have relied on operational criteria known as plus factors to 
determine whether a pattern of parallel conduct results from independent parallel 
conduct or from illegal collusion.146  
In Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets,147 the Court explained that the need for plus 
factors stems from “the desire not to curb procompetitive behavior.”148 Thus, in 
addition to demonstrating proof of consciously parallel behavior, a plaintiff must 
establish “the existence of certain ‘plus’ factors, including: (1) actions contrary to the 
defendants’ economic interests, and (2) a motivation to enter into such an 
agreement.”149 These plus factors comprise of some independent circumstantial 
evidence that gives rise to an inference of consorted action. In In re Flat Glass 
                                                                                                                                         
 141  Page maintains that with respect to the question of what would satisfy the requirement 
of “more” is far less clear from the opinion “[T]he Court offered a grab-bag of formulations.” 
Page, supra note 83, at 446 nn.42-52 and accompanying text. 
 142  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 36. 
 143  Baker (1993), supra note 6, at 145-98. The courts have explicitly recognized that “the 
distinctive characteristic of oligopoly is recognized interdependence among the leading firms: 
the profit-maximizing choice of price and output for one depends on the choices made by 
others.” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1251 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 144  Kühn & Vives, supra note 33, at 25. 
 145  Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). 
 146  “The inelegant term ‘plus factors’ refers simply to the additional facts or factors required 
to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a conspiracy.” AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 240. 
 147  Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 148  Id. at 1242. 
 149  Id. 
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Antitrust Litigation,150 the Court observed that the “existence of these plus factors 
tends to ensure that courts punish ‘consorted action’—an actual agreement—instead 
of the ‘unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.’”151  
The precise nature of the circumstances that may point in the direction of 
conspiracy in the presence of conscious parallel conduct has not been defined by the 
courts;152 rather, the list of possible plus factors has varied from case to case. It has 
been observed that “[t]here is no finite set of such criteria; no exhaustive list exists.”153 
Furthermore, various actions that may be perceived as constituting plus factors are not 
necessarily independent of one another; in fact, “some are likely to be simultaneously 
present or may otherwise be mutually reinforcing.”154 Finally, while there is no 
hierarchical relationship among the different circumstances that may constitute plus 
factors,155 the success rate of plaintiffs alleging different types of plus factors varies.156  
                                                                                                                                         
 150  In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 151  Id. at 360. 
 152  The existence of successful oligopolistic coordination may be inferred from a vast 
number of circumstances. Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in 
Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 1 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., MIT Press 2008); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. 
Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 
3 (1992); Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Detecting Cartels, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 
1 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., MIT Press 2008); Robert H. Porter, Detecting Collusion, 26 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 147 (2005). In Re/Max Int’l v. Reality One, 173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999), the court 
considered the following list of plus factors: 
(1)whether the defendants’ actions, if taken independently, would be contrary to their 
economic self-interest; (2) whether the defendants have been uniform in their actions; 
(3) whether the defendants have exchanged or have had the opportunity to exchange 
information relative to the alleged conspiracy; and (4) whether the defendants have a 
common motive to conspire. 
Id. at 1009. 
 153  In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360. 
 154  Kaplow, supra note 2, at 343. 
 155  ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 39, at 12; Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 
406. 
 156  For instance, the element of opportunity to conspire—such as meetings among the 
alleged conspirators—has been given relatively little weight. See, e.g., In re Baby Food 
Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999); Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 
346 F.3d 1287, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003). The Court asserted that “opportunity to fix prices without 
any showing that appellees actually conspired does not tend to exclude the possibility that they 
did not avail themselves of such opportunity or, conversely, that they actually did conspire.” Id. 
Furthermore, as a result of the advances in the economic literature, some observers suggest 
implementing economically oriented reformulation of agreement jurisprudence in 
circumstantial evidence cases, focusing on the components of successful cooperation by rivals. 
Kovacic et al. suggest that “[T]he most important threshold element of proof in this framework 
[in proposed circumstantial evidence cases] would consist of evidence showing how the 
defendants communicated their intentions and confirmed their commitment to a proposed 
course of action,” deeming a pattern of extensive communication among the firms that preceded 
a complex, parallel adjustment in behavior that could not readily be explained by their 
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As mentioned, the plus factors required by courts to establish that parallel behavior 
in particular circumstances constitutes concerted action differ. Perhaps the most-cited 
plus factor proposed by courts is the ‘contrary to self-interest’ factor.157 This factor 
consists of a formula used to determine whether the market under consideration is 
characterized by interdependence. The basic concept behind this factor is that 
collusion may be found if the conduct in question would have served the firm’s self-
interest only if its competitors acted in concert, but would have contradicted its rational 
economic self-interest if pursued unilaterally. 
Other courts required the plaintiff to demonstrate a rational motive for defendants 
to behave collectively.158 Still other types of circumstantial evidence include: the lack 
of other rational explanations for the observed market phenomenon except for the fact 
that it is the product of concerted action;159 evidence of direct communications among 
alleged conspirators;160 industry structure characteristics that complicate or facilitate 
                                                                                                                                         
independent efforts to be, perhaps, the most probative proof of the mechanism for achieving 
collusion. Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 408. 
 157  Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993); In 
re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002); Re/Max Int’l, 
173 F.3d at 1009 (stating that “[O]rdinarily, an affirmative answer to the first of these factors 
[i.e., action contrary to economic self-interest] will consistently tend to exclude the likelihood 
of independent conduct.”); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 571 n.35 
(11th Cir.1998) (“[A] showing that the defendant acted contrary to its legitimate economic self-
interest . . . is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the plaintiff show ‘plus factors’ beyond 
mere consciously parallel action. Other ‘plus factors,’ however, may also exist.”); see also 
Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust 
Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 748–9, n.131 (2004) (illustratively citing 
eleven cases, some of which cite or quote additional cases). 
 158  First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 286-7 (1968). However, it should be 
noted that in many cases, courts have been reluctant to confirm that the existence of a motive to 
conspire should amount to a ‘plus factor’ (e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 
at 12); see also EINER R. ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERALDIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 837 (Foundation Press 2007) (stating that “[A]nother major plus factor is 
understood to be a ‘motivation for common action,’ that is, some indication that the firms would 
have a disincentive to engage in the conduct unless others did the same. The problem is that this 
plus factor is true for cases of pure oligopolistic coordination, when no conspiracy is inferred.”); 
Werden, supra note 158, at 750–1 n.137 (see discussion and cases cited). 
 159  United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 874 (1975); Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956); United States 
v. Morton Salt Co., 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,304, at 80,268-9 (D. Minn. 1964). 
 160  In such instances, courts may infer that the firms used these opportunities to 
communicate a common action. E.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1331-2 (4th Cir. 
1979); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 
432, 445-60 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991); City of Long Beach v. Standard 
Oil Co. of California, 872 F.2d 1401, 1406-7 (9th Cir. 1989) (although often they hold that a 
“mere opportunity to conspire” cannot, by itself, establish an inference of collective action); 
Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1574-5 (11th Cir. 1991); Bolt v. Halifax 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 1990).  
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the avoidance of competition;161 and, industry performance factors that suggest or 
rebut an inference of horizontal collaboration.162  
Finally, the courts highlighted the implications of information-sharing as a 
mechanism that may constitute a plus factor to establish collusion.163 While the courts 
refrained from generating a comprehensive hierarchical framework of the plus 
factors,164 some observers view information-sharing as the most significant 
mechanism in collusion cases.165 The existence of communications between 
competing firms regarding price or other sensitive competitive information, coupled 
with parallel behavior that “tends to exclude” the possibility of independent action, 
can serve as evidence of tacit collusion.166 Communications that may contribute to the 
finding of conspiracy need not be direct however; such circuitous communications are 
often termed signaling.  
Signaling refers to the phenomenon in which firms convey information relevant to 
competition, such as pricing, to their competitors indirectly, via media or third 
parties.167 The main difficulty with the use of indirect means of communications for 
establishing illicit behavior is “how far may we move away from direct, detailed, and 
reciprocal exchanges of assurances on a common course of action and yet remain 
within the statutory and conceptual boundaries of an agreement.”168 
We dedicate a separate discussion to the issue of information-sharing and 
signaling, because—as elaborated in further detail below—we argue that some types 
of vertical information-exchange may and should constitute a plus factor and should 
be considered as such in order to prove the existence of concerted action. However, 
before delving into the details of our argument, a few paragraphs should be devoted 
                                                                                                                                         
 161  The likeliness of collusion may depend on the number of sellers; the entry barriers; the 
nature of the product (homogeneous or not); number and type of the buyers’ community; and 
the frequency of transactions. Hay, supra note 8, at 465; Clark, supra note 8, at 894-9. In fact, 
certain industry structures, firm histories, and market environments are conducive to collusion. 
POSNER (2001), supra note 8. 
 162  Relevant performance factors include such elements as the stability of market shares over 
time and high profit margins. Kovacic, supra note 3, at 54; see also Estate of Le Baron v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 441 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1971) (“[E]vidence of high profit margins is probative 
of the existence of a conspiracy.”). 
 163  See In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting parallel 
pricing, accompanied by direct evidence of communication regarding pricing between high-
level personnel is sufficient to infer conspiracy under Section 1).  
 164  ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 39, at 12; Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 
406. 
 165  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 49. 
 166  Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).  
 167  For instance, in Williamson Oil Co. V. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th 
Cir. 2003), the Court described ‘signaling’ as follows: “[A]ppelants identify several “signals” 
that allegedly were transmitted among . . . [defendants] as to their pricing intentions. The class 
claims that these signals were the means by which appellees’ price fixing conspiracy was carried 
out . . . by indirectly communicating with each other through media outlets and other public 
announcements.” 
 168  PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 2d ed. 1986). 
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to a term related to the concept of a plus factor, albeit one that has caused—and 
continues to cause—much confusion among the antitrust scholars, namely: facilitating 
practices. 
2. Facilitating Practices 
Facilitating practices are mechanisms designed to assist competing firms in 
achieving supra-competitive prices and to enforce price and output decisions.169 This 
practice is an activity that makes it easier for parties to coordinate pricing or other 
anticompetitive behaviors.170 “The danger of a facilitating practice is that it may, under 
certain circumstances, increase the likelihood of tacit collusion.”171 
The theory of facilitating practices was articulated as a response to the growing 
view of the inadequacy of the traditional antitrust approaches to combat 
anticompetitive practices employed by firms in oligopolic markets.172 This response 
arose as a result of the attempt by the antitrust enforcement agencies to develop new 
methods to address firms’ conduct that restricts competition.173 “[T]he modern concept 
of facilitating practices reflects an effort to bring within the reach of the antitrust laws 
some conduct which has the effect of making coordination easier and more effective 
yet which does not resemble the traditional Section 1 agreement.”174  
Indeed, the economic literature has identified various ways in which firms can 
coordinate their behavior implicitly, i.e., without resorting to express agreements or 
communications.175 Tools developed in game theory and collusion have provided 
antitrust enforcement agencies with new methods of examining strategies by which 
firms seek to coordinate behavior, while avoiding conduct that clearly could be 
                                                                                                                                         
 169  Salop, supra note 43, at 265–290. 
 170  Facilitating practice is not a “plus factor,” because it would be difficult to establish 
causation in fact between the activity and the alleged conspiracy. Holiday Wholesale Grocery 
Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1272, 1274-5 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
 171  DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 41, at 94. 
 172  George A. Hay, Facilitating Practices (ABA Competition Law and Policy, Cornell Legal 
Studies Research Paper, No. 05-029), http://ssrn.com/abstract=811404. 
 173  See, e.g., Blechman, supra note 8, at 889. The antitrust enforcement authorities 
incorporated insights made by economic literature into the enforcement schemes. For instance, 
in United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., [1974-2] Trade Cas. 75,253 (E.D. Mich. 1974), the 
Justice Department invoked the theory that, in certain instances, public price announcements 
may act as “signals” by which firms in oligopoly communicate with one another, producing an 
agreement on uniform prices. In that particular case, this theory was rejected. In United States 
v. Gen. Elec. Co. & Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
[1977-2] Trade Case 61,661 (E.D. Pa. 1977)), the Justice Department took the position that 
although the theory was “novel,” a court could establish the fact of conspiracy in restraint of 
trade based on evidence of signaling, relying—in addition to interdependence—upon the 
companies’ conduct being against self-interest and inconsistent with normal commercial 
practice, and the parties’ intent to exchange assurances to stabilize prices. For an extensive 
discussion, see Lionel Kestenbaum, What Is “Price Signalling” and Does It Violate the Law?, 
49 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 916-7 (1980). 
 174  Hay, supra note 173. 
 175  Baker (1993), supra note 6. 
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characterized as an illegal agreement.176 In fact, some of these schemes that advance 
collusion have encouraged government antitrust agencies to revisit enforcement 
approaches.177 
While neither the idea nor the term facilitating practice is novel, much confusion 
still exists within and across various streams of the literature with respect to its precise 
definition and the relationship between a facilitating practice and a plus factor. While 
the scholars of economics often use the two terms interchangeably, the terms are not 
synonymous. Legal scholarship defines plus factors as the elements that help a jury 
determine whether the competitors’ conduct is independent or a result of collusive 
action,178 whereas the term facilitating practice is applied to an action “taken by firms 
to make coordination easier or more effective without the need for an explicit 
agreement.”179  
Similarly, there is no clear indication of the relative evidentiary value of 
facilitating practices as opposed to plus factors; generally, the role that facilitating 
practices might play in the inference of a Section 1 agreement is ambiguous.180 For 
instance, some scholars argue that employing one or more facilitating practices “may 
provide the ‘plus factor’ needed to elevate consciously parallel behavior to the level 
of agreement . . . .”181 A facilitating practice represents affirmative voluntary conduct, 
therefore, there appears to be “no inherent reason why it should not be sanctioned if it 
is likely to lead to competitive harm.”182 Courts have traditionally recognized that, 
under the law, facilitating devices are not necessarily equivalent to a plus factor.183 
Nevertheless, various facilitating practices have been deemed to be unlawful under 
particular circumstances.184  
                                                                                                                                         
 176  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 13. Also, Yao & DeSanti, who explored ways to apply game-
theoretical tools to advance the enforcement of antitrust law, argue that “[G]ame theory raises 
interesting issues about the legal tests for tacit collusion, and may provide some useful insights 
. . . which can at least indicate when conduct is worth further scrutiny.” Yao & DeSanti, supra 
note 100, at 140. 
 177  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 13. 
 178  Hay, supra note 173, at 11. 
 179  Id. at 13. 
 180  Page, supra note 58, at 28. 
 181  Clark, supra note 8, at 913-4. 
 182  DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 41, at 95. 
 183  Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1274–5 
(N.D. Ga. 2002), aff ’d sub nom, Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2003). 
 184  See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (agreement to use basing point 
system); Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 45 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1965) (agreement to 
standardize content of macaroni). Use of a facilitating practice, whether or not pursuant to an 
agreement, can also be evidence from which price-fixing can be inferred. See, e.g., In re 
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446-48 
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991). In Petroleum Products, announcements of 
wholesale price changes were not alleged to be an independent basis for violation, but the jury 
was permitted to use such evidence as a basis for inferring an agreement to fix prices. 
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A facilitating practice is a scheme that is designed to assist otherwise competing 
firms to coordinate their price and output strategies without resorting to direct 
collusion;185 it is an action that makes coordination easier or more effective.186 These 
mechanisms allow the participating firms to acquire and maintain some degree of 
collective market power over time, resulting in supra-competitive pricing. 
Facilitating practices help firms solve the problems that accompany cartel 
formation, namely, reaching an agreement, detecting cheating rapidly, and ensuring 
effective punishment for deviations.187 In fact, with respect to the negative 
implications of the outcome, there is no fundamental difference between the tacit 
collusion achieved through facilitating practices and an express agreement of 
competitors to act in consort. “Under the facilitating practices theory, the 
communication or exchange of information . . . might lead, through coordinated or 
oligopolistic interdependence, to the same results the parties sought to achieve through 
their proposed formal agreement.”188  
However, the effect of facilitating practices on competition is not necessarily 
detrimental; facilitating practices may have positive as well as negative consequences 
for market efficiency and the level of competition.189 In fact, “determining whether the 
use of a given practice violates the antitrust laws therefore typically requires 
comparing its probable anticompetitive effects with its probable positive effects upon 
competition and efficiency.”190  
Indeed, different acts of firms may be viewed as constituting facilitating practices. 
Some examples include actions such as participating in price reporting systems,191 
incorporating most favored customer clauses,192 meeting competition clauses,193 and 
establishing delivered or basing-point pricing.194 Interestingly, while there is no 
                                                                                                                                         
 185  See generally Salop, supra note 43, at 265–90.  
 186  Hay, supra note 173, at 13. 
 187  Baker (1993), supra note 6, at 144; Salop, supra note 43, at 266. For a general overview 
of the theory, see TIROLE, supra note 43, at ch. 6; MARTIN, supra note 43, at ch. 10. 
 188  DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 41, at 121. 
 189  Clark, supra note 8, at 888, 903-4 (discussing the fact that facilitating practices are not 
“inherently anticompetitive”). In certain instances, product standardization may increase 
industry-wide competitive pricing, because product standardization may facilitate consumers’ 
ability to compare products on the basis of quality. Id. 
 190  Id.; see also id. at 904-06 (for a discussion of the ways to determine whether the use of a 
given facilitating practice injures competition by evaluating its positive and negative effects 
upon competition and efficiency).   
 191  Leslie, supra note 77, at 575-76. 
 192  See generally David Besanko & Tomas P. Lyon, Equilibrium Incentives for Most- 
Favored Customer Clauses in an Oligopolistic Industry, 11 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 347 (1993); 
Thomas E. Cooper, Most- Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON. 
377 (1986). 
 193  Salop, supra note 43, at 279-82. 
 194  See generally Dennis W. Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 51 (1983); David D. Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive 
Theories, 72 AM. ECON. REV.289, 289-306 (1982); POSNER, supra note 77, at 91-93; George J. 
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hierarchical relationship among the different practices, some observers view the 
exchange of private information among competitors—whether direct or through trade 
associations195—as the most significant facilitating practice in collusion cases.196 
Information-exchange may consist of the transmittal of data concerning pre-sale 
prices,197 pricing formulas,198 the expected demand in the market, sales quantities,199 
or recent price quotations.200 
3. Information-Sharing and Signaling as a Mechanism Enabling Cartel Formation  
As mentioned, direct communications and information-sharing are perhaps the 
most effective means that may allow competitors to create and to maintain a cartel, as 
“communication is a central part of the operation of a cartel.”201 However, due to the 
risk involved in the fact that establishing and maintaining direct communications 
constitute circumstantial proof of an agreement to fix prices and a plus factor, firms 
resort to other—perhaps less effective, but also less dangerous—means to facilitate 
collusion.  
Contrary to horizontal agreements—in which “an adverse impact on competition 
is presumed, and therefore . . . the plaintiff is spared the burden of proving such an 
impact”202— information-exchange may advance, as well as disrupt, competition. The 
instances of the positive effect of information-sharing on the level of competition 
include the firms acquiring more complete information about market conditions,203 
                                                                                                                                         
Stigler, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 147–64 (The 
Univ. of Chicago Press 1968).  
 195  Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 64, at 69-70 (discussing how industry associations or 
states’ governments may facilitate collusion by collecting and disseminating information). 
 196  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 49. 
 197  United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). It should be noted that the 
structure of the market plays an important role with respect to the competitive significance of 
information-exchanges. “Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on 
a truly competitive price . . . . The exchange of price data tends toward price uniformity” in 
oligopolistic markets. Id.; Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Facilitating Practices: The 
Effects of Advance Notice and Best- Price Policies, 18 RAND J. ECON. 187 (1987); Kestenbaum, 
supra note 174; Kattan, supra note 18. 
 198  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 50-51(quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1977 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 61,659 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Cf. Hay, supra note 8, at 462-63 (arguing that the agreement to 
use a uniform pricing formula does not, in itself, necessarily adversely affects competition, 
because it does not prevent firms from cheating its partners in collusion agreement; but it 
simplifies the process of establishing consensus price). 
 199  Hay, supra note 8, at 463. 
 200  Id. For a general discussion of the types of information-exchanges that may facilitate 
collusion, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE (West Pub. Co. 4th ed. 2011). 
 201  Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 423. 
 202  Hay, supra note 3, at 877. 
 203  Richard Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers 
Discussions, 67 GEO. L. J. 1187, 1193-97 (1979). 
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consumers obtaining the possibility of comparing prices,204 or in particular 
industries.205 In light of the fact that in certain instances, information-sharing may have 
potential beneficial consequences for social welfare, scholars argue that the sweeping 
prohibition of the exchange of data between competing firms is unwise and counter-
productive.206 Generally, the courts have signaled a similar outlook, refusing to deem 
all types of information-sharing among competing firms to be illegal per se.207  
Nevertheless, while some types of information-sharing can advance market 
competition—e.g., by providing consumers with more extensive information208—
other data exchange can promote concerted action and decrease competition by 
facilitating tacit collusion among competitors.209 Not surprisingly, advances in 
                                                                                                                                         
 204  Piraino, supra note 65, at 55. For instance, advance notice of price changes may benefit 
consumers, allowing them to plan their purchases.  
 205  Clark, supra note 8, at 927. For instance, Clark asserted that the crucial determinant of 
whether the procompetitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects in a particular 
information-exchange instance “will ordinarily be a function of the industry’s structure and 
basic operating conditions.” Id; see also Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for 
Coordination Among Firms, With Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
446, 457 (1983) (pointing out the efficiency of coordination among competitors in certain 
industries); Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEG. 
STUD. 615, 620-21 (2000) (discussing how coordination between a platform manufacturer and 
an application manufacturer has positive externalities). 
 206  Hay, supra note 8, at 463. Some scholars have argued that antitrust law is excessively 
suspicious of what may plausibly be perceived as an efficiency-enhancing collaboration. See 
also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) (arguing that 
antitrust law disproportionately attributes anticompetitive goals to behavior that has a plausible 
non-collusive justification); Xavier Vives, Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to 
Share Information, and Welfare, 21(3) RAND J. ECON. 409 (1990).   
 207  See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 42 (1978) (holding that “[t]he 
exchange of price data and other information among competitors does not invariably have 
anticompetitive effects;” therefore, it is not a per se violation). In an earlier decision, Am. 
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting), 
Justice Holmes stated that “I should have thought that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent 
interchange made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the future on both 
sides. A combination of such knowledge, notwithstanding its tendency to equalize, not 
necessarily to raise, is very far from a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade.” In a more 
recent decision, the Supreme Court stated that “antitrust law permits . . . discussions [among 
competitors] even when they relate to pricing, because the ‘dissemination of price information 
is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman Act.’” Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2002), aff ’d sub nom, Williamson Oil Co., 
Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Citizens & 
So. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975)). 
 208  See Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic 
Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 44 (1997) (“[I]n the familiar economic model of perfect 
competition, information is an unqualified good. This observation suggests that more 
information, available faster and at lower cost, can make markets more transparent, enhance 
buyer choices, help firms make better and cheaper products, and improve competition.”). 
 209  See, e.g., Richard N. Clarke, Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing, 14 
BELL J. ECON. 383, 383, 392 (1983) (explaining that in an uncertain economic landscape, all 
firms do not have an incentive to share information unless they are engaged in a cartel); Larry 
M. DeBrock & James L. Smith, Joint Bidding, Information Pooling and the Performance of 
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technology facilitate such information-exchange between competitors.210 As a result, 
commentators argue that in oligopoly markets, information-exchange “should now be 
an even greater concern to antitrust regulators.”211   
The incentives of otherwise competing firms to engage in information-exchange 
have been extensively studied by economics scholars.212 Since Novshek and 
Sonnenschein—who pioneered the research on the economics of information-sharing 
in an oligopoly in 1982213—much scholarly work concentrated on the issue of 
competing firms’ incentives to share their private information with competitors in an 
oligopolic market, i.e., horizontal information-sharing among competitors.214 More 
recently, the focus of the economic research shifted to the incentives to share private 
information among firms in vertical settings, such as in a supply chain; it is the vertical 
setting that motivated this article.  
It is well known that the risk of being exposed to antitrust investigations and the 
probability of being convicted and sanctioned for antitrust violations induces 
competing firms to avoid revealing their private information directly. Nevertheless, 
due to the financial benefits that accompany information-exchange, firms 
continuously search for alternative routes to provide and obtain such information. In 
the following pages, we will argue that the scheme of the information-exchange in 
vertical settings has significant implications for the antitrust legal scholarship and 
public policy; nevertheless, its negative consequences for the competition have yet to 
be recognized and addressed. However, before delving into the detailed argument, 
Section III is dedicated to discussing the literature that examined information-sharing 
among firms in vertical settings.  
                                                                                                                                         
Petroleum Lease Auctions, 14 BELL J. ECON. 395, 395–96, 404 (1983) (explaining how pooling 
cost and value estimates on oil tracts can reduce uncertainty and allow firms to bid more 
accurately in government auctions). The general perspective of economists has usually been 
that information-sharing maximizes total welfare only when firms share information in an effort 
to act competitively. See also Michael Raith, A General Model of Information Sharing in 
Oligopoly, 71 J. ECON. THEORY 260-88, 293 (1995) (contending that only rarely does 
information-exchange promote both firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus); Baker, supra note 
209, at 44 (arguing that rapid information-exchange among sellers can facilitate coordination 
and lead to supra-competitive prices by reducing coordination difficulties and concealing the 
conversations from consumers and antitrust agencies, and may also facilitate coordination by 
reducing firms’ incentive to deviate from the collusive price). 
 210  Carlton et al., supra note 58, at 423 (asserting that “businesses are often able, at low cost, 
to make information available to consumers and investors and, either advertently or 
inadvertently, to competitors as well.”); see also Baker, supra note 209. 
 211  Piraino, supra note 65, at 57. 
 212  E.g., Raith, supra note 210. 
 213  See generally William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, Fulfilled Expectations Cournot 
Duopoly With Information Acquisition and Release, 13 BELL J. ECON. 214 (1982).  
 214  See generally Clarke, supra note 210; Xavier Vives, Duopoly Information Equilibrium: 
Cournot and Bertrand, 34 J. ECON. THEORY 71 (1984); Esther Gal-Or, Information Sharing in 
Oligopoly, 53(2) ECONOMETRICA 329 (1985); Lode Li, Cournot Oligopoly with Information 
Sharing, 16(4) RAND J. OF ECON 521 (1985); Carl Shapiro, Exchange of Cost Information in 
Oligopoly, 52 REV. ECON STUD. 433 (1984); Raith, supra note 210. 
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III. VERTICAL INFORMATION-SHARING 
In general, much research has focused on vertical information-sharing—i.e., the 
exchange of information between firms that operate at different economic levels, such 
as the transmission of private information between a retailer and a manufacturer. The 
efficiency of a supply-chain depends on the way its members are able to coordinate 
their decisions; one of the principal ways to achieve this coordination is by exchanging 
information. As a result, scholars of operations management devoted much research 
effort to the study of the effects of information-exchanges on the efficiency of the 
supply-chain. This work developed into several streams of research.215   
The first line of research to study information-exchange in supply-chains adopted 
the view of a central planner, who is able to determine decisions and actions of the 
different firms in the supply-chain. In general, as more information is exchanged, the 
more the performance of the supply-chain benefits; this effect occurs due to better 
decision-making on capacity investment and allocation.216 Therefore, from the 
perspective of the supply-chain as a whole, researchers find a correlation between the 
quality of information and the overall performance of the supply-chain. 
Whereas the first stream of research focused on the effects of information-
exchange on the performance of the supply-chain as a whole, a second stream of 
research examined the problem through the prism of an individual firm. More 
precisely, it investigated the firm’s incentives to share its private information with 
other players in the supply-chain. Although information benefits the supply-chain 
overall, when firms operate independently, each firm must make the decision to share 
or to withhold its private information. As a result, a firm would divulge such 
information only if it believes it would be better-off sharing information than 
concealing it. Therefore, the second stream of research focused on the ex-ante 
incentives of competing firms to share information and the effect of the type of private 
information on the ex-ante incentives of the firms to share information.217  
In addition to examining the ex-ante incentives of firms to share information, 
researchers also looked at the ex-post incentives to truthfully reveal private 
information. In this case, the underlying question is whether firms have incentives to 
manipulate the information they share with other firms in the supply-chain. Scholars 
                                                                                                                                         
 215  Also, see Fangruo Chen, Information Sharing and Supply Chain Coordination, in 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: DESIGN, COORDINATION AND 
OPERATION (Stephen C. Graves & A.G. De Kok eds., Elsevier, Amsterdam 2003) for a thorough 
review of the research that studied the effects of information-exchanges on the efficiency of the 
supply-chain.  
 216  See, e.g., Yossi Aviv, A Time Series Framework for Supply Chain Inventory 
Management, 51(2) OPERATIONS RESEARCH 210 (2003); Özalp Ozer, Replenishment Strategies 
for Distribution Systems under Advance Demand Information, 49(3) MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 
255 (2003); Toktay, L.Beril & Lawrence M. Wein, Analysis of a Forecasting-Production-
Inventory System with Stationary Demand, 47(9) MGMT. SCI. 1268 (2001).  
 217  Vives, supra note 215; Gal-Or, supra note 215; Li, supra note 215; Esther Gal-Or, 
Information Transmission-Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria, 53(1) REV. ECON. STUD. 85 
(1986); Shapiro, supra note 215; Raith, supra note 210; Lode Li, Information Sharing in a 
Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition, 48(9) MGMT. SCI. 1196 (2002); Hongtao Zhang, 
Vertical Information Exchange in a Supply Chain with Duopoly Retailers, 11(4) PROD. & 
OPERATIONS MGMT. 531 (2002) (using a similar method to examine whether firms in a vertical 
relationship have ex-ante incentives to share information). 
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provide both empirical evidence218 and a theoretical basis219 for the occurrence of 
information manipulation.220  
In addition to the extensive study of the effects of and incentives for information-
exchange in a simple vertical relationship that consists of only one retailer and his 
manufacturer, another important stream of research examined the incentives for 
information-exchanges between a retailer and his manufacturer, in an environment in 
which there are several competing retailers. In such instances—i.e., when the market 
is characterized by competition between the retailers— there are weaker incentives to 
share information with the manufacturer.221 This phenomenon stems from the fact that 
in addition to the direct effect of information-sharing—i.e., the outcome for the 
immediate parties engaged in information-sharing, such as the retailer and the 
manufacturer—information-exchange in the presence of competition may have an 
indirect effect, sometimes termed information leakage, which is the ability of a 
competing firm to infer the private information shared between the retailer and the 
manufacturer. Information leakage occurs when the actions of a firm that acquires 
information and acts upon it are observable by other market players; this could lead to 
spillover effect of information-sharing, when the otherwise confidential information 
                                                                                                                                         
 218  E.g., Morris A. Cohen, Teck H. Ho, Z. Justin Ren & Christian Terwiesch, Measuring 
Imputed Cost in the Semiconductor Equipment Supply Chain, 49(12) MGMT. SCI. 1653 (2003) 
(documenting several examples of overly optimistic forecasts that were provided by a 
manufacturer to its supplier in several industries; and empirically quantifying the cost of the 
lack of credible information-sharing for a semiconductor equipment supply chain). 
219 E.g., Özalp Ozer & Wei Wei, Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision 
Under Asymmetric Forecast Information, 52(8) Mgmt. Sci. 1238 (2006) (demonstrating that the 
popular simple wholesale price contract results in information manipulation, which leads to no 
information-sharing). 
 220  To overcome the information manipulation problem, researchers suggest the use of 
sophisticated contracts, which align the incentives of the firms to truthfully share information. 
For example, in a screening model, the uninformed firm can offer a menu of contracts to induce 
the informed firm to reveal its private information by choosing a specific contract from this 
well-designed menu of contracts. Principal works in this area include: DREW FUDENBERG & 
JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1991); Evan L. Porteus & Seungjin 
Whang, Supply Chain Contracting: Non-recurring Engineering Charge, Minimum Order 
Quantity, and Boilerplate Contracts (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 
1589, 1999); Gerard Cachon & Martin Lariviere, Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share 
Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain, 47(5) MGMT. SCI. 629 (2001); Charles J. Corbett & 
Xavier De Groote, A Supplier’s Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric 
Information, 46(3) MGMT. SCI. 444 (2000); Albert Y. Ha, Supplier-buyer Contracting: 
Asymmetric Cost Information and Cutoff Level Policy for Buyer Participation, 48(1) NAVAL 
RES. LOGISTICS 41 (2001). Another way to resolve the problem of information manipulation is 
the use of signaling; in this case, the firm possessing superior information in the supply chain 
takes a costly action first, which conveys information to the uninformed party. The advance 
purchase contract in which the manufacturer offers a commitment contract to the supplier 
belongs to this literature as well. See, e.g., Gerard Cachon & Martin Lariviere, Contracting to 
Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain, 47(5) MGMT. SCI. 629 
(2001); Ozer & Wei, supra note 220, at 214.  
 221  Li, supra note 218; Zhang, supra note 218; Lode Li & Hongtao Zhang, Confidentiality 
and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination, 54(8) MGMT. SCI. 1467 (2008). 
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becomes transparent.222 Due to the focus of this paper, which concerns information-
sharing in the absence of direct communications between the competing firms, the 
following discussion concentrates on the second effect—i.e., the information leakage. 
In the cases of information leakage, the private information of one retailer, which 
is shared with the manufacturer, can be leaked unintentionally to the retailer’s 
competition through the pricing mechanism.223 Moreover, when the manufacturer 
determines the price based on the private information he receives from the retailer, a 
competing retailer can observe this price and infer the private information of the 
competitor from this price; since the price of the manufacturer is a function of the 
private information of the retailer, observing the manufacturer’s price can be 
equivalent to observing the private information itself.224   
In general, studies that have focused on the incentives for information-exchange 
in the presence of competition between the retailers conclude that the effect of 
competition lowers the incentives of competing firms to exchange information 
vertically (i.e., with their manufacturer). This outcome results from a retailer’s concern 
that his private information could be leaked—either indirectly through the 
manufacturer’s pricing mechanism, or deliberately by the manufacturer—to his 
competitors; this concern impedes a retailer from sharing his information.  
In contrast to the models that emphasize the negative effects of information 
leakage on the incentives of firms to share information in supply chains,225 Shamir 
                                                                                                                                         
 222  For example, retailers who know that the manufacturer receives some information from 
one retailer may respond by altering their own strategies; this response may have an effect—in 
terms of additional gains or losses—on the parties directly engaged in information-sharing. 
 223  See supra note 222. 
 224  Id. (arguing that since each retailer anticipates that the information he shares with the 
manufacturer could be leaked to the competitor, this information will not be shared with the 
manufacturer – an outcome that harms the performance of the supply-chain as a whole). 
Krishnan S. Anand & Manu Goyal, Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a 
Supply Chain, 55(3) MGMT. SCI. 438 (2009) (demonstrating that if a retailer shares his private 
information with the manufacturer, the latter may have an incentive to deliberately leak this 
information to the competing retailer, due to the intensified competition between the retailers—
an outcome that benefits the manufacturer, who is able to increase his sold quantity). The 
authors conclude that due to the possibility of information leakage, the retailer will choose not 
to share his information with the manufacturer. In contrast to Lee and Zhang, supra note 221—
who assume that information is leaked indirectly through the pricing mechanism—Anand and 
Goyal assume that information is leaked deliberately and directly by the manufacturer. i.e., the 
manufacturer shares the value of the private information of the retailer with the competing 
retailer. The problem of intentional information leakage can be mitigated by revenue sharing 
contracts. Guangwen Kong, et. al., Revenue Sharing and Information Leakage in a Supply 
Chain, 59(3) MGMT. SCI. 556 (2013). 
 225  For instance, Grossman and Stiglitz—who model the incentives for traders to acquire 
information under perfect competition—demonstrate that there is no pure strategy equilibrium with 
information acquisition when the clearing price conveys information from informed traders to 
uninformed traders. S.J. Grossman & J.E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70(3) AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980); T. Singer, Sharer Beware: Are You Giving Too Much 
Information About Your Business, INC. (Mar. 1999), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/19990301/4559.html (describing a case of information-exchange in 
the music industry). Sales data from Newbury Comics, a 20-store chain that sells records, were 
transmitted to SoundScan, a private company that tracks record sales and reports them to record 
labels, promoters and managers. These data were later leaked to stores like Wal-Mart and Kmart. 
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recently demonstrated that the retailers’ incentives to share their demand information 
with the manufacturer are driven by their expectation that their private information 
would be leaked to their competitors—thus, enabling them to coordinate on the 
monopoly price.226 In his model, the primary goal of the retailers is to share 
information at the horizontal level. However, when the option of horizontal 
cooperation is not available—e.g., due to the risk of being exposed to antitrust 
investigation and prosecution—the competing retailers choose to share their private 
information with the manufacturer, expecting this information to later reach their 
competitors. Although the direct effect of information-sharing results in increased cost 
to the retailers—because by using the retailers’ private data, the manufacturer is able 
set the wholesale price consistently with the realized demand—Shamir highlighted a 
new motivation for information-sharing with the manufacturer: by sharing information 
with the manufacturer, the retailers are able to signal their private information and thus 
establish a cartel. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Information-sharing constitutes one of the plus factors that may give rise to an 
inference of concerted action among competing firms. Currently, the antitrust 
authorities focus their enforcement efforts on detecting and establishing the instances 
of communications that take place among firms operating on the same economic level, 
i.e., the horizontal exchange of information. This focus of antitrust enforcement is not 
surprising; it is well known that horizontal communications may facilitate cartel 
formation, which—in turn—generates welfare loss due to a decreased competition 
level.  
On the other hand, the antitrust authorities have traditionally ignored the instances 
of another type of information-sharing—one that occurs between firms operating on 
different economic levels in a supply chain, namely, the vertical exchange of 
information. In fact, scholars of economics and operations have generally considered 
this type of information-exchange to be beneficial, maintaining that such vertical 
communications enhance the overall efficiency of the supply-chain.227  
In the following discussion, we provide a novel perspective on these issues. 
Specifically, contrary to the common antitrust practice of concentrating on horizontal 
communications, we argue that some types of vertical information-sharing may 
facilitate consort action, leading to similarly negative consequences for the social 
welfare as direct horizontal communications. In fact, as will be elaborated below, it is 
plausible that in some instances, the effect of vertical exchange of private information 
may be even graver from the welfare perspective, because such a practice is more 
detrimental to the competition. The reasons for this outcome are threefold: this 
collusion scheme is harder to detect, and, thus, it can be sustained for longer period of 
                                                                                                                                         
Id; Constance L. Hays, What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/yourmoney/14wal.html?_r=0 (reporting that 
Wal-Mart announced that it would no longer share its sales data with outside companies, such as 
Information Resources Inc. and ACNielsen, after these data were sold to other retailers); Anand & 
Goyal, supra note 225 (analyzing the incentives of an incumbent retailer, facing possible entry to 
his market, to acquire new demand information when this information could be leaked to an entrant 
by the mutual manufacturer). 
 226  Shamir, supra note 51. 
 227  For a general review of relevant literature, see Chen, supra note 216. 
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time; the manufacturer can set a higher wholesale price, which—in turn—harms the 
consumers; and, the retailers are able to solve the cartel’s coordination problem, which 
results in a more stable cartel. As a result, we propose that vertical information-sharing 
between firms in a supply chain should be included in the antitrust agencies’ agenda 
and scrutinized through the prism of antitrust law and precedents.  
It is important to mention, that the assumption that many firms in the market source 
the product from a small group of manufacturers is not necessarily artificial. For 
example, Delphi Automotive is a global vehicle component manufacturer, and its 
customers include the twenty-five automotive original equipment manufacturers in the 
world.228 In commercial aviation, every major airline buys equipment from the same 
vendors: Boeing and Airbus for large planes; Saab, Embraer and Bombardier for 
regional jets; General Electric, Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney for engines.229 
Along with the scope of our proposed strategy, it is important to emphasize what 
we do not include in our suggestions. First, we do not suggest that every type of 
vertical communication in a supply chain is undesirable and, therefore, should be 
precluded. In fact, it is plausible that, in certain instances and under certain conditions 
the benefits of such vertical exchange of certain types of private information by a 
retailer with his manufacturer outweigh the negative outcomes.  
Consequently, we do not suggest applying a per se rule to the instances of vertical 
information-sharing in the presence of competition. Traditionally, courts apply the 
rule of reason as the appropriate legal standard to judge the flow of information among 
competing firms.230 We propose applying the same analysis to vertical information-
sharing, analyzing how this type of communication facilitates collusion and price-
fixing in a particular market segment.  
Finally, before delving into the details of the proposed scheme, let us begin with 
an example of a hypothetical information-sharing situation between vertically-related 
firms. As will be elaborated further, under our proposal such a setting should fall under 
the scrutiny of the antitrust enforcement agencies.  
A. Example   
As mentioned, Shamir recently demonstrated that under certain conditions, vertical 
information-exchange in a supply chain may indeed produce collusive outcomes. An 
example of such a setting is as follows. Consider a market with two competing 
retailers, denoted by Retailer A and Retailer B. Both retailers serve a market with an 
unknown demand, and they source their product from a mutual manufacturer,231 who 
sets the wholesale price to maximize his expected profits.  
                                                                                                                                         
 228  Delphi Automotive, FORBES (2015), http://www.forbes.com/companies/delphi-
automotive/. 
 229  STEVEN J. SPEAR, CHASING THE RABBIT (Tata McGraw-Hill Educ. 2008). 
 230  For instance, see Carlton et al., supra note 58, at 424-25; see also DeSanti & Nagata, 
supra note 41. 
 231  The assumption that many firms in the market source the product from a small group of 
manufacturers is not as restrictive. For example, Delphi Automotive is a global vehicle 
component manufacturer whose customers include the 25 automotive original equipment 
manufacturers in the world (http://www.forbes.com/companies/delphi-automotive/). In 
commercial aviation, every major airline buys equipment from the same vendors: Boeing and 
Airbus for large planes; Saab, Embraer and Bombardier for regional jets; General Electric, 
Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney for engines. STEVEN J. SPEAR, THE HIGH-VELOCITY EDGE: 
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At the beginning of each selling season, each retailer can observe a signal that 
provides an assessment of the expected demand. However, the signal merely provides 
an estimate for the expected demand, and it is not accurate. As a result, although the 
market demand is high, it is possible for a retailer to observe a signal that predicts low 
demand and vice versa. Since the signal is not accurate, when the retailers attempt to 
establish a cartel, the issue of coordination is crucial.  
Both Retailer A and Retailer B would benefit from selling their merchandise at a 
certain, supra-competitive price. In the absence of antitrust regulations, the firms 
would openly communicate and set the price at the desired level. Even the exchange 
of information other than the future price—such as their private estimates of the future 
market demand—can have anticompetitive consequences by enabling the firms to 
elevate the prices above the competitive level. Therefore, in this case, the retailers 
would exchange information horizontally and would set the price at a level that is 
higher than the competitive price.  
Furthermore, when horizontal communications are allowed, the retailers would 
choose not to share their private information with their mutual manufacturer. The main 
reason for sharing private information is to coordinate on a collusive price that would 
allow the retailers to charge a higher price from the consumers compared with the 
competitive outcome; the retailers are able to reach this goal by exchanging 
information horizontally without sharing their information with the manufacturer. 
Sharing information with the manufacturer allows the latter to have a more accurate 
estimate of the future demand, thus, setting the wholesale price aggressively, i.e., 
charging the retailers a higher wholesale price. Hence, in this case, information is 
shared only between the retailers, and the manufacturer is not exposed to the shared 
information. 
However, in our scenario—when the direct communications between the firms A 
and B are precluded by the antitrust regulations, reinforced by heavy sanctions—while 
the firms realize the potential benefits of consort action—i.e., higher profit margins—
they also recognize the risk associated with the exposure to a possible antitrust 
investigation. The firms realize that mere communications between them could subject 
them to the scrutiny of the antitrust authorities. The firms’ options are either to ‘give 
up’ on the idea of colluding to increase the price, or to search for alternative 
mechanisms of coordinating the cartel. In other words, the firms need to find schemes 
for exchanging their private information that do not entail the risk of antitrust scrutiny.  
The first scheme that should be considered is the ability of the retailers—Firms A 
and B—to collude without any information-exchange. In this case, although the 
retailers are endowed with some private information about the future market demand, 
they attempt to reach coordination without exchanging any information. Two options 
are available for the retailers to reach a collusive outcome without any information-
exchange; the first option is called responsive pricing, and the second is referred to as 
price rigidity. In the responsive pricing option, each retailer determines the cartel price 
based only on his private information—i.e., the retail price is responsive to the private 
information that each retailer has observed. In this option, when setting the price, each 
retailer is not exposed to the private information observed by the other members in the 
cartel. This option raises a moral hazard problem, which can result in the collapse of 
the cartel. When neither retailer can observe the private information of the other cartel 
                                                                                                                                         
HOW MARKET LEADERS LEVERAGE OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE TO BEAT THE COMPETITION 
(McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 2009). 
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member, it is impossible to distinguish whether a low price set by the competitor is a 
consequence of observing a low signal, or, alternatively, a consequence of deviating 
from the cartel’s plan in order to secure a higher market share. It is possible that a 
retailer will choose to set a lower price, in order to increase his market share, although 
he observed a signal that should result in setting a higher price—a price that is 
associated with a risk of losing market share to the other retailer. When information is 
shared between the retailers, each retailer must set the price based on his observed 
information. As a result, when information is not shared between the retailers and they 
attempt to set the price based only on their private information, they might face severe 
coordination problems, which can jeopardize the existence of the cartel. 
In order to avoid the moral hazard problem, a second option available to the 
retailers is to adopt a price rigidity strategy. In this case, during each selling season, 
the retailers set the same price, regardless of the private information available to them. 
In this scenario, the retailers sacrifice the value information they have, in order to 
avoid the moral hazard problem discussed above. Under the rigid pricing strategy, the 
retailers set the same price during each selling season, and any deviation from this 
price is immediately interpreted as a deviation from the cartel’s scheme and, thus, can 
be punished harshly. In the responsive pricing strategy, when observing a low price, 
the retailer cannot distinguish whether this is a legitimate price, a consequence of 
observing a low signal about the future market demand, or, alternatively, a deviation 
from the cartel’s plan. As a result, in a responsive pricing scheme, it is not clear 
whether a low price should be punished. This—in turn—tempts the members of the 
cartel to indeed deviate from the cartel’s plan hoping not to be punished. In contrast, 
in the rigid pricing strategy a low price is immediately interpreted as being a deviation 
from the cartel’s plan; thus, the retailer who sets the low price is immediately punished 
in the subsequent selling periods. In the rigid pricing scheme, anticipating the fact that 
setting a low price would result in a harsh punishment lowers the incentives to deviate 
from the cartel’s plan.  
A third option available to the retailers, which is the focus of this article, is to try 
to solve the problem of coordination by using their private information indirectly. 
More specifically, rather than sharing information directly—that raises the suspicions 
of the antitrust authorities—the retailers can coordinate on the collusive price by 
sharing information with a third party. The retailers thereby achieve their goal to share 
information, which enables them to form the cartel, while avoiding the risks associated 
with the scrutiny of an antitrust investigation.  
In our scenario, Firm A and Firm B share their private information with their 
mutual manufacturer. As discussed, while vertical information-exchange is considered 
to be paramount in achieving coordination among supply-chain partners and 
increasing the overall efficiency of the supply-chain, the retailers do not have any 
incentive to share this information with their manufacturer if they can communicate 
directly. However, when the retailers cannot share information directly due to the 
scrutiny of the antitrust authorities, they can use the vertical channel, which is not 
considered to be related to anticompetitive behavior in the market. 
More specifically, if direct communications are precluded, Firm A and Firm B 
would each, separately, share their private information with the manufacturer. 
Equipped with this information, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price based on 
the information received. When the retailers observe the wholesale price, they 
understand that this price was determined based on the private information that their 
competitor sent to the manufacturer. Shamir has shown that the wholesale price 
encapsulates all of the information that each retailer needs to infer the information of 
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the competitor. Thus, upon observing the wholesale price, Firm A can infer the private 
information of Firm B, and vice versa. In this way, observing the wholesale price 
serves as a coordination device for the retailers. That is, the wholesale price provides 
the retailers with the information that they need in order to coordinate on the collusive 
price; the outcome of this scheme is analogous to the result that would have been 
reached had they shared the information directly horizontally.   
The immediate question to be answered is: what is the incentive of the 
manufacturer to accept the private information that the retailers share with him? Being 
rational, the manufacturer understands that receiving the private information from the 
retailers and posting a wholesale price based on this information will allow the 
retailers to form a cartel. This cartel results in a lower quantity being sold in the 
market, compared with the competitive outcome. Therefore, it appears that the interest 
of the manufacturer would be to try to preclude cartel formation by the retailers by 
rejecting their private information. However, in this case, the manufacturer is left 
uninformed about the future market demand; thus, he cannot set the wholesale price 
efficiently. Therefore, the manufacturer faces the following dilemma: to enable cartel 
formation by accepting the retailers’ private information and setting the wholesale 
price based on this information, or to refuse this information and set the wholesale 
price based on his own partial information about the market. Therefore, when the 
market is characterized by high volatility, gaining additional information about the 
future market demand is crucial to the manufacturer, and he might be willing to 
facilitate the formation of the cartel in exchange for this information. From the 
perspective of the retailers, this information-exchange can also be beneficial since, 
although they provide the manufacturer with additional knowledge to set the 
wholesale price more aggressively, they gain the ability to coordinate the cartel’s price 
based on the observed wholesale price. In this case, the retailers allow the 
manufacturer to set a more aggressive price in exchange for resolving the coordination 
problem of the cartel.                                   
B. Collusion, Vertical Information-Exchange and the Welfare Loss  
The primary economic concern raised by the practice of collusion is that it may 
reduce consumer welfare; this outcome results from cartels restricting output and 
destroying the surplus value consumers place on lost production.232 Usually, 
economists consider the deadweight social welfare losses that are generated when, due 
to supra-competitive prices, wealth is transferred from consumers to producers.233 
Contrary to the earlier research that emphasized the advantages of vertical 
information-sharing in a supply chain, Shamir demonstrated that when retailers 
communicate their private information with respect to market demand to the mutual 
manufacturer, such a practice may entail negative consequences. Specifically, in 
Shamir’s model, such vertical information-sharing allows the retailers to coordinate 
on a monopoly outcome by restricting output or fixing price at a desired—supra-
competitive—level. Due to the fact that such result adversely affects competition, this 
                                                                                                                                         
 232  BORK, supra note 66, at 263. 
 233  Id. But cf. Lande, supra note 4. Furthermore, Posner argued that the social loss from 
collusion may be higher if firms engage in socially wasteful non-price competition or costly 
exclusionary activities. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. 
POL. ECON. 807 (1975). 
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scheme has significant implications for the antitrust regulation and enforcement 
strategies.    
While different from the perspective of the antitrust enforcement policies—which 
traditionally concentrate on horizontal information-sharing—there is neither 
analytical foundation nor economic justification for discriminating between the 
horizontal and the vertical information-exchange. In other words, the instances in 
which a collusive outcome results following a direct exchange of private information 
between competing firms are not qualitatively different from those occurrences in 
which such an outcome is generated as a result of each firm sharing its information 
with a third party—the manufacturer—but the collusion became possible due to the 
leakage effect. 
In fact, from the perspective of social welfare, the anticompetitive outcome in the 
setting when private information is revealed to other competing retailers due to the 
leakage of information through the manufacturer is even less desirable than direct 
collusion to fix prices, e.g., when the firms divulge their information directly to one 
another, while the manufacturer remains ignorant of its contents. This result is 
attributed to the fact that in addition to the profit margins that are gained by the firms 
following the exchange of information, when the manufacturer obtains the 
information, he also sets a higher wholesale price, which results in a further reduction 
in the consumers’ welfare.234 
There is another reason to suggest that the welfare loss in the case of vertical 
information-exchange is, in fact, greater than the loss resulting from direct collusion; 
this result can be attributed to the existing antitrust policy and practice. Because the 
retailers share their information with the manufacturer rather than directly with each 
other, under the current antitrust enforcement regime, they avoid the risk of becoming 
exposed to investigation and potential sanctions by the antitrust agencies. As a result 
of the fact that the antitrust authorities currently concentrate their enforcement efforts 
on horizontal—rather than vertical—information-sharing, collusion between the 
retailers can persist over significant periods of time, virtually undetected and 
undeterred.   
It is, therefore, evident that vertical information-sharing may produce significant 
losses from the perspective of social welfare. In fact, such losses may even be greater 
than those caused by direct collusion. Therefore, from the public policy perspective, 
it would be beneficial if the antitrust authorities included the instances of 
communications in vertical relationships in their enforcement efforts. However, 
because vertical information-exchange may well have beneficial effects on the supply 
chain, they should not be prohibited categorically, as is elaborated further below. We 
now turn to consider whether the current regulations and case law present the antitrust 
authorities with a sufficient basis to establish collusive action in such cases of vertical 
information-exchanges. 
C. Addressing Vertical Information-Sharing Under the Current Antitrust Regime  
Much academic criticism has been directed at the formalistic approach to the 
phenomenon of collusion that has, thus far, characterized the attitude of the antitrust 
enforcement agencies and the courts. This approach focuses on the existence of 
communications in order to establish the fact of collusive action and illegal price-
fixing. Hence, in the following discussion we refrain from repeating these anti-
                                                                                                                                         
 234  Shamir, supra note 51. 
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formalistic considerations, nor do we suggest novel alternative methods for detecting 
and evaluating collusive behavior.235 Instead, we focus on the current antitrust regime 
with respect to the legal definition of collusion—i.e., communication-based 
prohibition.  
We argue that under the existing statutes and case law that regulate competition 
and antitrust, some instances of vertical information-sharing should be scrutinized and 
may, in some cases, be deemed to constitute a plus factor that helps to establish a 
collusive outcome. Naturally, our approach does not exclude the possibility that 
findings of future research might suggest creating new, separate standards to be 
applied in the instances of vertical information-sharing. Instead, we suggest that 
vertical information-sharing may—combined with other factors—be applied as 
supporting evidence to determine the fact of consort action. Following the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in the case of Leegin—which abandoned the per se illegality 
of resale price maintenance—in the instance of vertical information-exchange in a 
supply chain, we suggest that such a practice is “useful evidence for a plaintiff 
attempting to prove the existence of a horizontal cartel”236 and “should be subject to 
more careful scrutiny . . . .”237 
In cases of alleged conspiracy, courts must determine whether certain observed 
outcomes resulted from an agreement to collude between the competing firms, or 
whether they are the consequences of parallel unilateral conduct. Courts do so by 
drawing a fine distinction between the firms’ commitments to a common goal of 
restricting trade or raising prices and an independent rational behavior that simply 
takes the actions of other market players into account. However, while at first glance 
this distinction between collusive behaviors and conscious parallelism does not appear 
to be ambiguous, the standards applied by the courts to establish illegal collusion 
remain regrettably equivocal. Nevertheless, we can outline a number of parameters 
that have been found to bear significance in the judicial findings of illicit collusion.  
First, as discussed, it has been established that conscious parallelism is not—by 
itself—illegal; in the absence of other supporting evidence, conscious parallelism does 
not engender an inference of an anticompetitive conspiracy by the firms. Because 
direct evidence of an agreement to establish a cartel—such as the testimony of one of 
the conspirators or documents that constitute an agreement—is rarely available, the 
courts have ruled that the existence of an agreement under Section 1 may be 
established based on circumstantial evidence. In such a case, the fact-finder must 
provide some further facts that plausibly point to the conclusion that the competing 
firms were engaged in something more than mere conscious parallelism. These 
additional elements have been referred to as plus factors.   
While the courts have established that the presence of plus factors may provide a 
sufficient basis for the finding of conspiracy to collude, they have not provided clear 
parameters that define the practices that would fall under this definition. In fact, much 
of the criticism of the current antitrust case law is based on the fact that while courts 
                                                                                                                                         
 235  For instance, one such alternative approach is suggested by Kaplow, who argues that a 
“direct approach that encompasses all coordinated price elevations that can be detected and 
sanctioned effectively” is preferable to a formalistic focus on the existence of communications. 
Kaplow, supra note 11. 
 236  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2007). 
 237  Id. at 2719. 
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may find collusion based on circumstantial evidence, the precise nature of the 
evidence required—i.e., what sort of evidence amounts to a plus factor—remains 
ambiguous. Some observers argue that this uncertainty “is attributable mainly to the 
vacuity of the Supreme Court’s definitions of agreement and the absence of a coherent 
economic definition that might fill the void.”238   
Second, similar to Matsushita’s standard of sufficiency of the evidence needed to 
raise a jury question, under the more recent Twombly standard of pleading, the plaintiff 
must “produce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of conscious 
parallelism.”239 While the Twombly decision has imposed a more challenging standard 
of plausibility for alleging agreement under Section 1, scholars criticize the majority 
opinion as being “regrettably vague and even misleading about what sorts of 
allegations will be sufficient to meet the standard.”240  
Third, it should be noted that the size of the market share may not serve as a 
defense against the alleged collusion. Therefore, the antitrust enforcement agencies 
may establish liability in horizontal collaboration involving direct rivals without 
regard to the firms’ collective market power. In fact, under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, actions may be brought even if the participants in a horizontal price-fixing 
arrangement “had little genuine prospect of affecting price through their joint efforts 
to restrict output.”241  
Finally, recognizing the inherent difficulty of detecting direct conspiracy, the 
courts permitted the inference of antitrust conspiracies from acts falling short of 
explicit communication of an unlawful agreement. That is to say, more often than not, 
antitrust conspiracies fall short of the paradigm cartel case, in which the firms’ 
representatives hold a secret meeting and plot price-elevations or output restrictions. 
Therefore, it is possible to prove antitrust agreements using other evidence. In addition 
to the existence of a rational motive to conspire, the parallel adoption of a facilitating 
practice, and an anticompetitive benefit to be derived from that conduct, the actions 
that are contrary to the firm’s independent self-interest—unless pursued as part of a 
common scheme—are, by far, the most important to courts in finding circumstantial 
evidence of conspiracy.242  
1. Conduct Contrary to a Firm’s Independent Self-Interest   
The idea behind this plus factor is quite straightforward: if a firm, acting in its own 
best interest in response to market stimuli would not rationally take the course of 
action in question unless it expected others to take a similar action to further the 
conspiracy, such action constitutes a plus factor—circumstantial evidence—that may 
be employed to establish the fact of consort action. In fact, courts noted that behavior 
                                                                                                                                         
 238  Page, supra note 58, at 28. 
 239  Page, supra note 83, at 449. 
 240  Id. at 468; see also Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and 
Beyond, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55 (2010) (arguing that the Court in Twombly should have 
focused more on the nature of proof required to establish antitrust conspiracies). 
 241  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 6. 
 242  Dibadj, supra note 131, at 405 (“This is likely because the emphasis in plus factors 
analysis has been toward trying to find circumstantial evidence of agreement or conspiracy, and 
motive and self-interest purportedly can serve to screen for this.”); see also Blechman, supra 
note 8, at 885. 
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contradictory to an individual firm’s economic self-interest is “perhaps the strongest 
plus factor indicative of a conspiracy”243 and that this plus factor may be sufficient to 
raise an inference of conspiracy. 244      
In our scenario, retailers—Firm A and Firm B—may increase their profit margins 
if they cooperate successfully and fix prices at a supra-competitive level. Naturally, 
each firm refrains from sharing its information directly with its opponent; it also 
avoids communicating its intent to convey this information to the manufacturer. This 
avoidance of any form of direct communication is consistent with the rational behavior 
of competing firms, because the existence of direct communications can stimulate the 
interest of the antitrust authorities, with subsequent investigations and potential 
sanctions.  
Nevertheless, while refraining from any type of direct communications between 
them, both firms share their private estimates of the future market demand with the 
manufacturer. From the perspective of competitive markets, such communications are 
irrational, because divulging such information to the manufacturer leaves each firm 
worse off. This result is due to the fact that the manufacturer can use that information 
to extract higher profit margins at the expense of the retailers.  
This case is qualitatively different from the instances in which firms act in a 
manner that is consistent with their independent self-interest, e.g., when sharing their 
private information is in their self-interest, irrespective of whether their competitors 
provide such information as well. Thus, it should not be difficult for courts to identify 
such vertical information-sharing as being contrary to a firm’s independent self-
interest.245  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly, collusive action would not 
be inferred when an independent justification for the action exists; in addition to 
parallel conduct, some plausible ground for thinking that the parallel conduct is the 
result of a conspiracy must be demonstrated. The significance of this criterion lies in 
the fact that it precludes inferring agreement in cases in which a firm’s actions are in 
its individual self-interest, regardless of whether its competitors act in the same way.  
In our scenario, each retailer’s actions are not in his individual self-interest, unless 
other retailers act in the same manner and provide the manufacturer with their private 
information, which would later be leaked to their competitors through the wholesale 
price set by the latter. In fact, the evidence is consistent only with the conclusion of 
collusive action, because the retailers lack an independent economic justification for 
sharing their private information with the manufacturer, other than the hope that this 
sharing would lead to information leakage and price coordination. As a unilateral 
action, such information-sharing is contrary to each firm’s economic interest.  
Just as a firm can directly invite competitors to collude in order to limit output or 
to obtain supra-competitive pricing, a firm can communicate its private information 
concerning the future market demand to the manufacturer, expecting its competing 
retailer to response in a similar manner. This conduct is expected to result in 
coordinated pricing.  
                                                                                                                                         
 243  Merck-Medco Managed Care v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *10 
(4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999). 
 244  In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).   
 245  Scholars noted that acting against their self-interest includes such practices as the 
disclosure of confidential information. Piraino, supra note 65, at 15. 
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Therefore, in this case of vertical information-sharing—where the parallel conduct 
is contrary to the independent economic self-interest of the firms engaging in this 
practice—a strong inference of illicit conspiracy is engendered. Firms anticipate 
collusive action when they take an action—i.e., communicate their private information 
to the manufacturer—which is in each firm’s rational best interest only if it results in 
coordinated pricing. Under these circumstances, an illegal agreement to restrict 
competition may be inferred. 
2. Absence of a Plausible, Legitimate Business Rationale for Conduct 
The absence of a plausible, legitimate business rationale for suspicious conduct—
such as certain communications with rivals—is considered to be one of the plus factors 
that may be employed to establish illegal collusion. While in the current case law, 
there is no hierarchy of plus factors according to their evidentiary value, some 
observers consider the absence of a plausible business rationale for conduct to be one 
of the “chief plus factors.”246 
In the case of the vertical information-sharing described above, the retailer reveals 
his private information—such as the expected market demand—to the manufacturer. 
Under certain assumptions employed in the model described in this article, this action 
makes economic sense only as a means of furthering a tacit agreement to raise prices 
above the price that would prevail in the absence of collusion. More specifically, there 
is no plausible, legitimate business rationale for such information-exchange to occur, 
because, as discussed, each retailer would be worse-off divulging his private 
information to the manufacturer; such communications are in each retailer’s best 
interests only if he believed that this conduct would subsequently lead to coordinated 
pricing.  
 Thus, vertical information-sharing between an individual retailer and the 
manufacturer—when the retailer divulges his private estimates of the future market 
demand to the latter—cannot be explained rationally as part of the legitimate course 
of business. Rather, such conduct can be explained solely as a strategy that promotes 
collusion.  
3. Parallel Adoption of the Facilitating Practice 
In our scenario, competing Firms A and B each adopted the same facilitating 
practice, namely, information-exchange with a mutual manufacturer. However, this 
action was conducted without any express agreement between the firms. The question 
that arises under these circumstances is whether parallel pricing together with parallel 
adoption of facilitating practices—namely, vertical information-exchange—could 
allow a court to infer the requisite agreement?   
The parallel adoption of a facilitating practice requires a conscious choice on the 
part of competing firms. Therefore, in the case of the parallel adoption of a facilitating 
practice that permits noncompetitive pricing, the problem of remedy—which was one 
of the points disputed by Turner and Posner—is mitigated.247 After all, to enjoin the 
restriction on competition, in such a case, the court would not have to command the 
firm to act irrationally. In fact, the competing firms are no longer independent rational 
players in the market, but rather make a conscious decision to circumvent the antitrust 
controls and act in a manner that facilitates restrictions on market competition. 
                                                                                                                                         
 246   Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 405-06. 
 247  POSNER, supra note 77, 98-9; Turner, supra note 8, at 675-6. 
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Therefore, one can argue that whenever uncompetitive market behavior is enabled by 
facilitating practices, courts may characterize the practices as circumstantial evidence 
that supports the finding of an unlawful agreement to restrict trade. 
Although the Court ruled that “‘facilitating devices’ are not necessarily sufficient 
under the law to constitute a ‘plus factor,’”248 we can argue that in the case of vertical 
information-sharing, the fact that both retailers engaged in the facilitating practice—
sharing their private information with the manufacturer—in itself constitutes a plus 
factor that could be sufficient to establish illicit collusion.  
Finally, there is often an independent justification for a firm to adopt a practice 
that might constitute a facilitating practice that enables price coordination.249 Thus, 
under the Matsushita standard, the parallel adoption of a facilitating practice does not 
necessarily exclude the possibility that the rivals were acting independently.   
However, in our scenario it may be successfully argued that under the Matsushita 
standard, the parallel adoption of a facilitating practice—i.e., divulging private 
information to a mutual manufacturer— in certain instances, excludes the possibility 
that the rival firms were acting independently. The courts may permit the inference of 
a horizontal agreement under Matsushita, because each firm lacks a legitimate rational 
reason for adopting the practice. Since in our scenario the facilitating practice has an 
anticompetitive effect—since it facilitates noncompetitive oligopolistic behavior 
without inducing retailers to provide consumers with some beneficial services—the 
court may declare it to be illegal under the rule of reason.  
4. Applying the Rule of Reason to the Instances of Vertical Information-Sharing  
It is widely accepted among economists, as well as the scholars of antitrust law, 
that horizontal information-sharing can benefit—as well as harm—consumers. 250 
Therefore, as part of their decision on the nature of particular information-exchanges, 
whether it does or does not suffice to constitute circumstantial proof of illegal 
collusion, the courts apply the rule of reason, weighing the likely anticompetitive and 
pro-competitive effects thereof.251 The rule of reason requires an analysis of the 
consequences of particular practices in order to determine whether they unreasonably 
restrain trade.252 
In fact, although it has been suggested that the rule of reason is “one of the most 
amorphous . . . one of the most important . . . [and] one of the most misunderstood 
                                                                                                                                         
 248  Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1274–5 
(N.D. Ga 2002), aff ’d sub nom, Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2003). 
 249  See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 63, at 33 (discussing the example of Ethyl, where “the 
court refused to condemn industry-wide use of advance notification of price changes, price 
protection clauses, and delivered pricing, even though they facilitated price uniformity, because 
the practices had been adopted when there was only a single seller in the market and thus 
evidently served non- collusive purposes that consumers wanted.”). 
 250  See Page, supra note 58, at 32. 
 251  Clark, supra note 8, at 888; Page, supra note 58, at 32. For a general discussion of the 
rule of reason and its applications, see Carrier, supra note 54. 
 252  E.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-9 (1978); United 
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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rules in antitrust,”253 it appears that the application thereof has been on the rise, as part 
of the trend of shifting the analysis away from per se rule by the Supreme Court.254 
We suggest that a similar rule of reason analysis should be applied to the instances of 
vertical information-sharing in supply-chains. More specifically, we argue that in the 
absence of direct evidence that the retailers have conspired to fix prices—which is 
illegal per se, and thus, a fact finder need not establish its anticompetitive effects—
the rule of reason is the appropriate legal standard by which to judge the flow of 
information between competing retailers and their mutual manufacturer. Under this 
proposition, in assessing the nature of a restraint of trade, the antitrust authorities and 
the courts should examine how vertical communications affected prices in a specific 
market segment, focusing on the detrimental effects to competition.255    
Applying the rule of reason to evaluate communications recognizes the fact that 
competing firms may have valid reasons for disclosing their private information. In 
fact, such information-exchanges may have a pro-competitive effect and be beneficial 
to the consumers. However, it is usually agreed that in order to be deemed beneficial, 
the exchange of information among competitors should be publicly available.256 We 
emphasize again that, in general, a vertical information-exchange can increase the 
efficiency of a supply-chain, and thus have positive and pro-competitive effects. 
However, in our setting, there is no incentive for the retailers to divulge their 
information to the manufacturer, other than their desire to coordinate on a collusive 
supra-competitive price.    
When applying the rule of reason, a number of factors should be taken into 
account. First, the fact-finder must demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect of 
the practice in question.257 Thus, in the case of vertical information-sharing, the likely 
consequences thereof should be taken into account. If the disclosure of information by 
the retailers to their mutual manufacturer is beneficial to the competition and the 
consumers, it should not be prohibited or discouraged. However, when, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 253  Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16(4) 
GEO MASON L. REV. 827, 827 (2009).   
 254  Id. at 828.   
 255  Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 256  E.g., Carlton et al., supra note 58, at 433 (consumers may benefit from obtaining 
information about prices that would allow them to compare) (arguing that “[C]onsumers who 
can find out about competitor’s [sic] prices, product selection, and delivery and service policies, 
are more likely to make an informed choice . . . . This is exactly how competition is supposed 
to work.”).  
 257  Carrier, supra note 54, at 1268 (It appears that instead of directly balancing the 
anticompetitive and the pro-competitive effects of a practice in question, the courts have 
engaged in burden-shifting, “typically dismissing the case at any one of three stages that 
precedes the ultimate balancing”). The burden-shifting approach that has been offered by the 
courts in the overwhelming percentage of cases works as follows: The plaintiff initially “must 
demonstrate that the practice it challenges has had ‘an actual adverse effect on competition as a 
whole in the relevant market.’” CDC Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs. Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 
1999) (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 
1995)) (emphasis omitted), If the plaintiff makes this showing, “the defendant must establish 
the ‘pro-competitive redeeming virtues’ of the practice.” Id. If the defendant demonstrates this, 
“the plaintiff must then demonstrate ‘that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved 
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.’” Id. 
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anticompetitive effects of such an information-exchange outweigh its potential pro-
competitive justification, such a practice should be considered to violate the antitrust 
regulations.  
In the case of a vertical information-exchange of the kind considered by this article, 
this practice may well be deemed to be anticompetitive and illegal under the rule of 
reason, because such practice brings about the noncompetitive oligopolistic behavior 
without inducing retailers to provide beneficial services. More specifically, observing 
the wholesale price that is set by the manufacturer based on the separate private 
estimates of future demand, competing retailers obtain valuable information about the 
market and about their competitors’ private information. This information restricts 
competition since it enables the retailers to set their prices at a supra-competitive level.  
In fact, similar to an express agreement to adhere to announced prices, providing 
the manufacturer with private information about the expected market demand greatly 
reduces the complexity of coordinating prices among the retailers, because the 
wholesale price that is set by the former reflects the combined estimate of the market 
demand. Thereby, the retailers are able to solve the problem of monitoring the cartel 
price.  
On the other hand, it appears that vertical information-exchange incorporates no 
pro-competitive benefits, because consumers do not acquire any valuable information. 
To the contrary, the consumers are worse off due to the fact that as a result of the 
information-sharing, the retailers are able to coordinate on a supra-competitive price. 
Therefore, it appears that in such a scenario, when a particular information-exchange 
is bound to generate collusion that harms consumers without any offsetting economic 
benefit, the courts may—and should—infer illegal collusion.  
Naturally, not each and every instance of vertical information-exchange need be 
discouraged or prohibited; we have already discussed the social welfare benefits that 
a coordinated supply-chain can offer. Applying the rule of reason would take the 
positive, as well as the detrimental, consequences thereof into account. In addition to 
the likely effects of specific instances of information-exchange on the desired level of 
competition, the desirability of the practice of vertical information-sharing would also 
depend on the substance of the private information transmitted.  
Finally, the retailers in our setting took specific measures to promote collusive 
outcomes—i.e., shared their private information with the manufacturer—in the hope 
that their competitors would replicate this step. Since this exchange of private 
information with the mutual manufacturer has an anticompetitive effect on the market 
(because the information is reflected in the price set by the manufacturer), it has the 
effect of chilling the vigor of price competition; thus, the lack of culpability, which 
may prevent establishing liability in some instances, does not apply to this case 
because the firms’ actions were clearly avoidable. Therefore, collusion may be 
inferred according to the rule of reason. 
5. Consistency with the Statutory Definition 
It appears that two legal theories could support a case challenging the practice of 
vertical information-sharing that, on balance, injures competition. First, while 
traditionally, to be considered a facilitating practice, information-exchange had to 
occur between competing firms—i.e., horizontally—we argue that this is no longer 
necessary. In our case, the action of the competing retailers—supplying private 
information to their mutual manufacturer—falls short of the ‘traditional’ horizontal 
information-exchange; nevertheless, we argue that the flow of information that takes 
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place between the competing firms and their mutual manufacturer—i.e., vertical 
information-exchange —may similarly constitute a facilitating practice.  
Conveying this private information to the manufacturer would not result in profit 
for an individual retailer, unless others act in a similar manner. In fact, as discussed 
above, such conduct is contrary to the retailer’s individual self-interest. Thus, it is clear 
that the information is shared as part of a scheme to obtain a signal that would allow 
the competing firms to set supra-competitive prices.  
The second way to attack the particular types of vertical information-sharing in a 
supply-chain under the antitrust doctrine involves Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such 
actions could be challenged on the ground that—in conjunction with other 
circumstances in the case—its use by competing retailers constitutes an agreement to 
fix prices, or to restrain trade unreasonably in some other fashion. In fact, scholars 
argue that the language of the Sherman Act is broad enough to allow the courts to find 
illegal conspiracies when oligopolic firms engage in mutual conduct against their 
independent self-interest; the meeting of the minds that exists in such cases is similar 
to that which exists under express cartels. 258 
In fact, actions by retailer firms—who share their private information with a 
mutual manufacturer in anticipation of similar action on the part of their competitors 
and expecting to receive signals about the market from the manufacturer—are a type 
of affirmative conduct that may be construed as an implicit form of agreement by the 
participating firms. Such an approach can be justified as constituting the “‘meeting of 
the minds,’ whereby competitors recognize that it is in their collective best interests to 
set price or quantity equal to the collusive level.”259 
Moreover, the risk of investigation and persecution under Section 1 instigated 
firms to take precautions to avoid detection by establishing a common course of action 
without resorting to traditional communications, so that no evidence of ‘conspiracy’ 
is available.260 Therefore, restricting the scope of behavior covered by Section 1 to 
explicit agreements would severely curtail the antitrust enforcement and appears to no 
longer be relevant in the contemporary market environment. On the other hand, 
“deemphasizing the conspiracy requirement has the added the benefit of bolstering 
antitrust enforcement in a world in which defendants have learned not to leave 
evidence of agreement behind.”261  
Restraints on trade—whether those that occur as a result of ‘traditional’ 
conspiracy, or those that take the form of a signal received following a vertical 
exchange of information—can and should be deemed to be violations of the Sherman 
Act.262 
                                                                                                                                         
 258  George A. Hay, Oligopoly Shared Monopoly and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
439, 457 (1981) (asserting that “[N]o less a meeting of the minds exists when duopolists . . . 
select the identical list price and recognize the folly of price cutting, than when twenty 
manufacturers . . . ‘agree’ in a hotel room to charge an identical price.”). 
 259  Devlin, supra note 66, at 1112-3; see also DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J. JENSEN, 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2013). 
 260  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 17. 
 261  Dibadj, supra note 131, at 603. 
 262  Simonetti, supra note 69, at 1229 (“[the] focus of the Sherman Act thus must be shifted 
from a preoccupation with conspiratorial behavior to a greater concern for harm to the public 
and injury to competition.”). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Despite the long history of the antitrust legislation and case-law, the debate about 
its ultimate goal is ongoing; some scholars emphasize enhancing economic efficiency 
as being the primary concern of the antitrust policies, others contend that the primary 
purpose of the antitrust legislation is consumer protection, i.e., preventing competing 
firms from charging consumers supra-competitive prices.263 While in some situations 
the choice among antitrust goals could make a significant difference,264 the case of 
vertical information-sharing—as many other situations of antitrust concern, such as 
routine horizontal price-fixing265—is one of the cases that “give rise to both allocative 
inefficiency and a transfer of wealth from purchasers to the cartel.”266 
In light of the negative consequences that accompany restricted competition, the 
antitrust agencies work to detect, prosecute and sanction collusion. Central to these 
enforcement efforts is the definition and proof of concerted action. However, scholars 
argue that despite the crucial role of the concept of collective action, the design of 
evidentiary standards to determine the basis of parallel conduct—whether it stems 
from illegal collective or from legitimate unilateral decision-making—modern 
antitrust analysis remains perplexing and vague.267 This lack of satisfying standards is 
a “remarkable ambiguity at the heart of antitrust law.”268 
Traditionally, to establish collusion, the courts demanded the proof of the existence 
of agreement between the cartel members. However, recognizing the fact that more 
often than not direct evidence in cases of collusion is unavailable,269 gradually the 
courts moved away from a formalistic approach, recognizing that alternative 
mechanisms and circumstantial evidence may suffice in order to establish collusion. 
270   
The courts have held that in addition to conscious parallelism, the antitrust 
agencies must provide some other evidence that supports the allegations of consorted 
action, ‘plus factors.’271 While the antitrust enforcement agencies struggle to develop 
evidentiary standards for identifying collusion, the competing firms in an oligopolistic 
                                                                                                                                         
 263  John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
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LEXIS 26299, at *16 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2010), Judge Richard Posner observed, “Direct evidence 
of conspiracy is not a sine qua non . . . . Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust 
conspiracy.” Kovacic et al., supra note 23, at 395 n.7. 
 271  ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 39, at 11-16. 
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industry realize that they are players in a repeated game, and act accordingly, devising 
measures to evade authorities’ scrutiny and avoid behavior that may constitute plus 
factors. In fact, it appears that the antitrust authorities and the firms are locked in a 
continuous struggle; improvement in detection measures and anti-collusion programs 
implemented by the antitrust authorities encourage firms to take countermeasures and 
achieve agreements through more subtle techniques.272  
In such an environment, extra-legal fields—e.g., such as industrial organization 
and game theory273—play a significant role in providing antitrust enforcement with 
novel tools and directions to discover collusion strategies. It appears that vertical 
information-sharing in a supply chain, is one such strategy, because it allows 
otherwise competing firms to coordinate behavior and set prices above competitive 
level, while escaping the scrutiny of the antitrust authorities.  
Information-exchange has “the same effect on market outcomes regardless of 
whether it is by agreement or spontaneous as under tacit collusion.”274 The case of 
vertical information-sharing discussed in this article clearly falls under the latter 
category.  
While parallel conduct alone does not engender an inference of agreement, it may 
do so when it cannot be explained as an interdependent action. The post-Twombly 
cases show that while it is difficult, it is not impossible to establish the existence of an 
agreement even without alleging communications. However, in the scenario explored 
by this article, the communications indeed take place. The novelty of our approach 
lies in the fact that these communications occur in a vertical relationship between 
retailers and the manufacturer, rather than horizontally between the competitors. 
Including such forms of communication in the list of facilitating practices that can be 
employed to establish the fact of illegal consorted action would allow the antitrust 
authorities to investigate—and, potentially, sanction—firms in instances that hitherto 
have eluded antitrust scrutiny.   
It has been argued that it is “desirable for an efficient competition policy to 
intervene to some extent in information-sharing as to make explicit or tacit collusion 
between firms harder.”275 Due to the anticompetitive outcomes of vertical information-
sharing in a supply chain, we suggest that antitrust authorities should scrutinize this 
type of conduct.   
The insights of this paper have numerous legal and policy applications. For one, 
the antitrust enforcement should update its formulations of the existing rules to include 
some forms of vertical information-sharing in a supply chain as supplementary 
evidence for collusive behavior, or declare it to be a restriction of competition in itself 
due to its being a facilitating practice, i.e., because it creates market conditions under 
which collusion becomes likely, without firms having to resort to explicit agreements. 
                                                                                                                                         
 272  Kovacic, supra note 22. 
 273  Kovacic, supra note 3, at 13 (“Recent industrial organization learning about game theory 
and collusion has provided new tools with which antitrust enforcement officials can examine 
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 274  Kühn & Vives, supra note 33, at 112; see also Hay, supra note 3, at 892 (arguing that 
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Hovenkamp suggests that rather than focusing on the issue of whether a “meeting 
of the minds” existed, the antitrust enforcement should concentrate on the question of 
whether a particular type of behavior should be suppressed by the law.276 He argues 
that “in the presence of interdependence . . . communications among rivals about 
planned output changes increase the danger of collusion.”277 Along the same line, we 
argue that communications among rivals are not qualitatively different from 
communications between the retailers and manufacturer, when they induce the same 
outcome, namely, collusion. Absent pro-competitive justifications, such vertical 
communications should be considered to constitute an illegal agreement to collude 
according to the Sherman Act. 
Finally, we leave it for future scholarship to ponder whether the instances of 
vertical information-sharing should be judged according to the same economic 
principles that govern horizontal information-sharing, or whether novel analytic tools 
should be developed. 
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